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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the short time frame of about the last two decades, technology has
greatly changed the way people communicate. Use of personal computers
did not become widespread in the United States until the 1980s, and use of
the internet was not widespread until the 1990s.1 Today, many Americans,
especially young people, regularly communicate via email, instant messaging, text messaging, personal websites, and social media, such as Facebook
or Twitter.2 Unsurprisingly, given that new communications technology is
only a tool directed toward human ends, the messages communicated reflect the broad range of human thought, emotion, and activity expressed in
previous years without the use of such technology. 3 At its best, such technology has been used to facilitate connections between people, to exchange
and spread ideas in a way that contributes to the dialogue so important to
democratic societies (and to people who aspire to establish a democracy
where one does not exist), and to disseminate information that contributes
to the success of social events from parties to business activities to revolu1. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
2. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1027, 1032 (2008). In this Comment, I use the term “online speech” (and also “internet
speech”) as shorthand to refer to any communication transmitted through computers, cell
phones, or other electronic devices. It is meant to include emails, instant messages, text
messages, use of personal websites, use of social media websites such as Facebook or Twitter, or any other post of a video, comment, audio clip, or other communication to any website. This Comment focuses specifically on such “online” speech rather than print speech,
and it relies on the wealth of literature, including law review articles and court cases, that has
emerged over the past two decades to answer the question of how to handle cases involving
student internet speech. See infra Part IV.B.1.
3. Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1036.
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tions against oppressive regimes.4 At its worst, new communications technology has been used to widely publish false or hurtful information about
others, whether done maliciously or thoughtlessly through the unreflective
click of a mouse, and to plan criminal activity.5
The rapid proliferation of new communications technology has raised
a variety of new legal questions, the resolutions of which require courts,
legislators, and citizens to make decisions on how to apply or change the
law to account for such technology. One of these questions is how public
secondary schools may deal with electronic messages and web postings
made by students from an off-campus location when those communications
contain content alleged to be threatening, offensive, or potentially disruptive.6 As student use of these technologies has increased,7 schools have increasingly sought to discipline students for off-campus internet activity.8
Two legal issues are raised when schools discipline students for offcampus internet activity. First Amendment freedom of speech9 issues are
implicated since courts consider electronic messages sent over the internet
to be speech.10 Additionally, the separate, but somewhat intertwined, issue
regarding the scope of public school authority over students’ off-campus
activity is raised.11
Generally, when a school makes legal arguments supporting discipline
for a student’s off-campus speech, the school invokes either the “true
threat” doctrine or the “Tinker test.”12 Courts have held that “true threats”
are considered unprotected speech under the First Amendment regardless of
4. See Jennifer Preston, While Facebook Plays a Star Role in the Revolts, Its Executives Stay Offstage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A10 (discussing the role of Facebook and
other social media in revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia).
5. See Ravi Somaiya, In Britain, A Meeting on Limiting Social Media, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2011, at A4 (calling attention to discussions in the British government on placing
limitations on social media after rioters in London used the internet to outmaneuver police).
6. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa.
2002).
7. Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1032.
8. See, e.g., Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d
Cir. 2007).
9. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Since
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that First Amendment protections are incorporated into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment protections of the right
to freedom of speech apply to the states and state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment,
just as they apply to “Congress” and the federal government. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1; Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Public schools are state actors
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See, e.g., Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.
2d 1175, 1177, 1180-81 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
11. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850.
12. See, e.g., id. at 856, 860-62.
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where they occur.13 The “Tinker test” comes from Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that students have a First Amendment right to freedom of speech at
school so that schools cannot discipline students for speech unless the
speech causes, or can be reasonably forecast to cause, “substantial disruption” to school activities.14 Tinker protects student speech on campus, but it
also creates a separate “student speech” standard that offers less protection
for student speech occurring on campus than the First Amendment provides
to other forms of protected speech.15 The Tinker case involved speech that
occurred on campus,16 and the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that it
applies to speech that occurs off campus or outside a school’s supervision
and control.17
13. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969))). See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
616, 622, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that threats of violence are not protected speech
under the First Amendment and upholding a school’s decision to discipline a student); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that “a true threat is
unprotected by the First Amendment. Thus, a conviction . . . based on a finding that the
statement was a true threat, would not violate Fulmer’s constitutionally protected right to
speech” in a case affirming the defendant’s criminal conviction for threatening a federal
agent).
14. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 509 (1969).
15. See id.
16. Id. at 504.
17. See Tiffany Emrick, Comment, When MySpace Crosses the School Gates: The
Implications of Cyberspeech on Students’ Free-Speech Rights, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 785, 790
(2009). Many courts and commentators make a distinction between “on-campus” student
speech, which schools can regulate in accordance with on-campus Supreme Court precedents, and “off-campus” speech over which schools have less authority. Usually, such courts
and commentators define these terms in a way that allows some speech that does not actually
originate on school property to be treated as on-campus speech, such as, for example, allowing speech with a sufficient nexus to the school, or speech that could have been reasonably
foreseen to arrive at the school, to be considered on campus no matter where the speech
originates. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir.
2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 864-65; Emrick, supra, at 786, 797-800. Harriet A.
Hoder argues that it is preferable to use the terms “under school supervision and control”
and “outside school supervision and control” instead of “on campus” and “off campus.”
Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School
Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1594-95 (2009). She
argues that this emphasizes the temporal nature of school authority over a purely geographic
view of school authority. Id. Although I qualify Hoder’s approach slightly by emphasizing
the geographic and temporal nature of school supervision and authority, I generally support
the supervision approach, so I make use of supervision and control language at times. Lee
Goldman, professor of law at the University of Detroit-Mercy School of Law, uses the terms
“on campus” and “off campus” interchangeably with “under” and “outside” of “school supervision.” See Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 397 n.8 (2011). I follow Goldman’s usage by treating the
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Despite this, many other courts have applied the Tinker student speech
standard to off-campus speech instead of giving off-campus speech the full
protection to which it is entitled under the First Amendment.18 Sometimes
judicial opinions have relied on the notion that internet speech is not isolated to one geographic location, but effectively takes place everywhere at the
same time, in order to make the argument for applying the Tinker standard
to off-campus internet speech.19
Most, but not all, legal scholars who have addressed the issue of public
schools disciplining students for off-campus internet speech have rejected
the notion that Tinker applies to off-campus internet speech simply because
internet speech may be accessed anywhere at any time.20 Instead, most legal
scholars have argued that student speech that occurs off campus, or outside
of school supervision, should receive full First Amendment protections
instead of the more limited protection set out for speech falling under
school supervision in Tinker or its progeny.21 Some commentators have also
argued that a comprehensive approach should be taken to the issue that conterms “on campus”/“off campus” and “under school supervision”/“outside school supervision” interchangeably. While I prefer the greater precision of the latter set of terms, I often
make use of the former set of terms because they make for less cumbersome writing and
because they are used so often by courts and commentators.
18. See infra Part IV.B.1.
19. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“For better or worse, wireless internet access,
smart phones, tablet computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-ofconsciousness communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to speech that makes any
effort to trace First Amendment boundaries along the physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for serious problems in our public schools. . . . Trying to limit [school authority]
along real property lines is bound to run into trouble . . . there can be difficulty in knowing
whether speech has occurred on or off campus.”).
20. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.B.1.f, particularly note 242.
21. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 17, at 407; infra Parts IV.B, IV.B.1.f. In this
Comment, I use “full First Amendment protections” and “full First Amendment standard” to
refer to the legal rule that would apply to speech if it occurred off campus. I contrast that
with the “student speech standard,” which I use to refer to the less speech-protective legal
rule that would apply to student speech if it occurred on campus and the Supreme Court’s
student speech rules applied. See infra Part III (introducing the student speech standard and
the Supreme Court cases governing on-campus student speech). Technically, the “full First
Amendment standard” and the “student speech standard” both provide the full extent of First
Amendment protections within their respective spheres—the student speech standard is
simply application of First Amendment principles to the on-campus school context. My use
of these terms should not be interpreted as suggesting otherwise. I have chosen to use these
terms as shorthand for two reasons. First, using these terms as shorthand makes for clearer
and less cumbersome writing. Second, use of these terms makes sense in the context of offcampus speech, where, according to most commentators, the protection afforded by school
speech rules actually does fall short of the full protection to which speech is entitled under
the First Amendment. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.B.1.f. My use of these terms also follows the
usage of some other commentators. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 17, at 407.
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siders all possible alternatives in addition to school discipline that might be
taken to address the problem posed by student internet speech.22
In addressing both the First Amendment issue and the scope of school
authority issue in the secondary school context,23 I seek to support both of
these positions. I argue that Tinker and its progeny should not apply to offcampus internet speech for several reasons. First, there are very few, if any,
benefits to applying Tinker to off-campus speech since schools have other
less restrictive measures for dealing with the problems posed by off-campus
internet speech.24 Second, the costs of applying Tinker to off-campus
speech are significant since this would limit students’ right to freedom of
speech outside of school, which would deprive students and their communities of the salutary effects of student free speech rights.25 Third, school authority should have limits so that schools may focus on their educational
mission rather than on policing speech in the general community. 26 Finally,
contrary to the views of some commentators, it is in fact possible to articulate a clear legal standard that distinguishes between on- and off-campus
internet speech.27
By making these arguments in support of a general rule that Tinker
and its progeny should not apply to off-campus internet speech, I am following the lead of most legal scholars, who tend to agree on this general
rule,28 even if courts have not consistently adopted this view.29 But, even
22. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 397. Goldman argues that a “comprehensive
approach” that encompasses “traditional” and online student speech should be taken toward
the student speech issue. Id. Mary-Rose Papandrea, assistant professor at Boston College
Law School, also takes an approach that takes into account various ways of dealing with the
problems caused by online student speech other than school discipline. See Papandrea, supra
note 2, at 1098-101.
23. This Comment discusses these issues only in the public secondary school context. It does not address private schools at any level because private schools are not considered state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment, so First Amendment protections on
freedom of speech do not apply in private schools. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 837, 840, 842 (1982). This Comment also does not address free speech issues or the
scope of authority for public colleges and universities, which are governed by different rules
than public secondary schools. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008). It
also does not address what issues may occur in public primary schools. As one commentator
who similarly chose to focus on secondary schools noted, there is not necessarily a reason to
treat primary and secondary schools differently in terms of the legal analysis, but since most
cases with these issues occur at the secondary school level, it seems most appropriate to only
speak to that particular grade level. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1032 n.19.
24. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
25. See infra Part IV.B.2.b; infra note 370 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
27. See infra Parts IV.B.1.f, IV.B.3, IV.B.4 (showing that some courts and commentators, and this Comment, have advocated rules that clearly distinguish between on- and
off-campus internet speech).
28. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.B.1.f, particularly note 242.
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scholars that agree on this general rule often disagree over how to define
what speech is “on campus” and what speech is “off campus,” especially in
the context of internet speech, where it is sometimes difficult to clearly
define the location of the speech.30
The failure to provide a clear test for what speech should be considered “off campus” and what speech should be considered “on campus” has
made it more difficult for courts to adopt the general rule that off-campus
internet speech should not be subject to Tinker and its progeny.31 It has also
led to a situation where even courts and commentators that agree that offcampus speech should not be subject to Tinker and its progeny have often
held positions that allow speech that really should be considered “off campus” to be regulated under a school speech standard.32
Another problem exists in relation to threatening speech. Courts and
commentators have often assumed that schools have the authority to apply
school rules to govern off-campus speech if the speech is of the type that is
unprotected by the First Amendment.33 This has led courts to uphold school
discipline in cases of “true threats” without considering the scope of school
authority to discipline students for off-campus illegal conduct.34
Therefore, in addition to supporting the oft-argued point that Tinker
and its progeny should not apply to off-campus speech, I seek to add nuance to the discussion of the issue and to articulate a new conceptual
framework that courts may use to decide cases involving some form of offcampus internet speech. To that end, I argue the following: (1) in “true
threat” cases,35 courts should only allow a school to discipline a student for
off-campus internet speech when there is some connection between the
speech and the school; and (2) when deciding whether electronic messages
and internet postings created or sent from an off-campus location may be
treated as on-campus speech for the purposes of the Tinker test or its progeny, courts should determine whether the off-campus speech was intentionally (re)communicated by the student while he or she was under school supervision (effectively transforming the off-campus speech into on-campus

29. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.B.1.f, particularly notes 166-68, 183, 243.
30. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.B.1.f, IV.B.4.
31. See infra Parts IV.B.1.a-f, IV.B.2 (explaining the various approaches to distinguish between on- and off-campus speech and discussing some weaknesses and problems
with these approaches).
32. See infra Part IV.B.1.f.
33. See infra Part IV.A.
34. See infra Part IV.A.
35. The “true threat” analysis is derived from Watts v. United States. See Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969); infra Part II.B.1.
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speech) by using the Spence v. Washington test for communicative conduct.36
This Comment maintains that the scope of public school authority over
students’ off-campus activity should be held within certain limits in all contexts, including cases of “true threats.” It also buttresses the general rule
that Tinker and its progeny do not apply to off-campus speech that would
otherwise be protected under the First Amendment. It does this by clarifying when speech may be considered to take place on campus or off campus.
Specifically, the rule I propose would ensure that only on-campus speech is
subject to Tinker by defining on-campus speech to only include speech content that, even if created off campus originally, has become on-campus
speech through its being intentionally (re)communicated by its originator at
an on-campus location.
Part II briefly touches on freedom of speech jurisprudence to highlight
legal theories justifying robust protection of speech. It then discusses the
First Amendment categories of unprotected speech. These are important
because, when considering whether school authority and special First
Amendment rules governing student speech should be extended to cover
off-campus speech, it is important to keep in mind the extent to which traditional First Amendment categories of unprotected speech may already protect schools from the harmful effects of off-campus internet speech. Part III
provides background on the issue of student speech by reviewing the four
U.S. Supreme Court cases in which the Court has articulated the studentspeech standard.
Part IV articulates the proper limits on public school authority over
off-campus internet speech. Subpart A addresses threatening speech that
occurs off campus. It notes that courts have failed to consider limits on
school authority when affirming school discipline for true threats occurring
off campus by foregoing an analysis of where the speech occurred and
whether it had some connection to the school. This subpart proposes that
courts should only affirm school discipline for an off-campus true threat if
the school can show some connection between the true threat and the school
(such as showing a “sufficient nexus”). In this way, courts could ensure that
true threat case law does not improperly extend the scope of school authority beyond what is necessary to ensure school safety. Subpart B discusses
non-threatening internet speech alleged to be disruptive, vulgar, or offensive that occurs off campus. It reviews the approaches taken on this issue by
courts and legal scholars, and it argues that only approaches offering full
First Amendment protection to off-campus speech should be used. Then,
this subpart offers an approach that is best suited to fully protect student
36. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see also infra Part
IV.B.3 (explaining the Spence test).
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First Amendment rights without harming a school’s ability to maintain discipline—namely, requiring that off-campus internet speech be intentionally
communicated on campus by the speaker before it may be treated as oncampus speech. It proposes that, when it is unclear whether off-campus web
content has been communicated on campus, courts should apply the Spence
test for communicative conduct to determine if such communication of the
off-campus speech occurred on campus. This approach presents a new and
coherent theoretical framework that supports a clear rule on the issue of
when courts may apply school speech precedents to student internet speech.
Finally, Subpart B illustrates how this approach should be applied in specific situations that schools are likely to face in the future.
II.
A.

SPEECH UNDER THE FULL FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD

FREEDOM OF SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

The justifications for protecting speech under the First Amendment
provide reminders of the ultimate goals that are to be served through the
creation of legal rules relating to free speech. Freedom of speech is essential to democratic self-governance, vital for the protection of human dignity
and autonomy, and supportive of the search for truth through a “marketplace of ideas.”37 Government based on the will of the people can only exist
where citizens are free to discuss political ideas.38 For this reason, political
speech receives the highest level of protection by the Court.39 Many scholars also see freedom of speech as essential to a human need for selfexpression.40 Speech allows for self-actualization, as speakers communicate
messages that define who they are to their audience.41 Therefore, a right to
freedom of speech protects human autonomy through the right to selfdefinition and human dignity by supporting an essential human need.42 Another justification for freedom of speech—the “marketplace of ideas” theory43—arises from its importance at discovering knowledge and truth.44 According to this line of thinking, freedom of speech allows the expression of
a wide variety of competing ideas, and the truth is most likely to be revealed through this competition.45 Courts and scholars differ over the de37. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1208-12 (3d ed. 2009); 1 RODNEY
A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2:3-2:6 (3d ed. 2012).
38. SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:6.
39. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
40. SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:5.
41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1211; SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:5.
42. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1211; SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:5.
43. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1209.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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gree to which each of these justifications support certain constitutional rules
regarding the freedom of speech, but the general ideas behind these justifications are widely accepted.46
B.

UNPROTECTED SPEECH

When deciding whether a special student First Amendment standard
should place additional limits on off-campus student speech and, if so, what
those limits should be, it is important to consider the limits on speech that
apply even under the full First Amendment standard. The First Amendment
does not grant license to engage in any form of speech at any time and
place one chooses.47 According to well-established U.S. Supreme Court
case law, speech that is not protected under the First Amendment includes
true threats,48 speech that incites illegal activity,49 fighting words,50 obscenity,51 and child pornography.52 Even when speech is protected under the
First Amendment, the state may restrict speech to an appropriate time,
place, and manner provided that it does not do so based on the content of
the speech.53 States may also enact statutes prohibiting speech that constitutes harassment or defamation and ascribe criminal and civil penalties to
those forms of speech, provided that these state statutes do not run afoul of
First Amendment protections on the freedom of speech.54 Parts II.B.1-II.B.4
46. Id. at 1209-12.
47. E.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981).
48. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969); see infra Part II.B.1
(discussing the test for “true threats”).
49. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969); see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the test for speech that incites illegal activity).
50. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see infra Part II.B.3
(discussing the test for “fighting words”).
51. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). The three-part test for obscenity that is used today was formulated in Miller v. California, where the Court stated:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
52. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that child pornography
is unprotected under the First Amendment even if it does not qualify as obscenity); see also
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (holding that pornography must
be produced with real children to be considered child pornography).
53. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
54. Goldman, supra note 17, at 416; Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1100-01.
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discuss three types of speech not protected under the First Amendment—
true threats, speech that incites unlawful activity, and fighting words—as
well as time, place, and manner restrictions.55
1.

True Threats

The First Amendment protects certain types of threatening speech.56 If
the alleged threats are made as jokes, hyperbole, or under circumstances
where they are not to be perceived as serious, they are considered protected
speech. However, the First Amendment does not protect “true threats,” so a
state may subject someone who makes a “true threat” to criminal penalties.57
Courts cite the 1969 case Watts v. United States58 as the source of the
“true threat” doctrine.59 In Watts, an eighteen-year-old attending a political
rally at the Washington Monument said: “If they ever make me carry a rifle
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”60 Those listening responded to the comment with laughter, but nevertheless, he was arrested under a
federal criminal statute prohibiting someone from “knowingly and willfully
. . . threat[ening] to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States.”61 Citing principles of free speech, the Court read
a requirement that there must be a “true threat” into the language of the
statute.62 The Court then held that the context in which the alleged threat
was made, the response of laughter by the audience, and the conditional

55. Most court cases involving off-campus internet speech that may be unprotected
under the First Amendment involve alleged threats or other types of offensive, lewd, or
vulgar speech. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 85051, 856, 860-62 (Pa. 2002). Time, place, and manner restrictions are also essential in maintaining a setting conducive to education at school and must be understood in order to fully
comprehend student speech issues. See infra Part II.B.4. While sexually explicit communication that may reach the level of constitutionally unprotected speech is increasingly becoming
an issue with the rise of “sexting,” implicating issues of child pornography, see Emily
Bazelon, The Ninny State, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, at 11, this issue is not addressed by
this Comment, which instead focuses on the kinds of threatening and offensive speech addressed more frequently in the courts. The lack of further discussion of obscenity or child
pornography in this Comment does not reflect a determination that these categories of unprotected speech are unimportant or irrelevant in the context of secondary school students.
56. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969).
57. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
58. Watts, 394 U.S. 705.
59. Id. at 708. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622,
626-27 (8th Cir. 2002); In re A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶¶ 21-25, 626 N.W.2d 712.
60. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
61. Id. at 705-07.
62. Id. at 708.
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nature of the threat demonstrated the speech in this case was “political hyperbole,” not a “true threat.”63
In subsequent cases, the Court has cited Watts to support the proposition that the state may pass laws criminalizing “true threats” without running afoul of the First Amendment.64 But the Watts Court did not clearly
define what constituted a true threat.65 In Virginia v. Black, the Court elaborated:
“True threats” encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition
on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.”66
Although the Court appears to have stated a subjective requirement that the
speaker mean to communicate the serious expression of intent to harm,67
some lower courts have interpreted it as an objective test of whether a reasonable person would consider the statement to communicate a serious expression of intent to harm.68 Some lower courts have also filled in a list of
factors to be considered in deciding whether speech constitutes a true threat,
including
[1] how the recipient and other listeners reacted to the alleged threat, [2] whether the threat was conditional, [3]
whether it was communicated directly to its victim, [4]
whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements to the victim on other occasions, and [5] whether the
victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat
had a propensity to engage in violence.69

63. Id.
64. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
65. In re A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶ 21, 626 N.W.2d 712.
66. Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (alternation in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., In re A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶¶ 22-23.
69. E.g., id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 626 N.W.2d 762).
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Speech that meets this standard is not protected speech under the First
Amendment, which means that someone can be punished criminally for
threatening speech that satisfies this “true threat” test.70
2.

Speech that Incites Illegal Activity

The First Amendment also protects some speech advocating illegal activity.71 However, the First Amendment does not protect speech advocating
illegal activity if the speech is intended to incite imminent illegal activity,
likely to actually bring about the imminent illegal activity, and directed
toward a specific individual or group.72 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court
addressed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader who gave a speech at a
Klan meeting at which he said: “[I]f our President, our Congress, and our
Supreme Court, continues [sic] to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s
possible that there might have to be some revengence [sic] taken.”73 He was
convicted under an Ohio statute that made it a crime to advocate illegal
activity or assemble with a group formed to advocate “criminal syndicalism.”74 The Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional, reasoning it
failed to distinguish between “mere advocacy” and “incitement to imminent
lawless action” as required by the First Amendment.75 The Court stated that
speech advocating illegal activity may only be banned when the speech is
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.”76
In subsequent cases, the Court set a high standard for the imminence
requirement of the Brandenburg test.77 The imminence requirement is not
met when a person’s advocacy of illegal activity is not sufficiently concrete
(such as when it does not call for a specific action to be taken),78 when it is

70. See id.; infra Part IV (addressing the significance of the potential for criminal
penalties for threatening speech as it bears on the question of whether school discipline
should provide an additional means of sanctioning the same kind of speech).
71. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
72. Id. at 447; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106, 108-09 (1973) (“Since . .
. Hess’ statement was not directed to any person or group of persons, it cannot be said that
he was advocating, in the normal sense, any action.”).
73. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-46.
74. Id. at 444-45.
75. Id. at 448-49.
76. Id. at 447.
77. Hess, 414 U.S. at 106-07, 109 (reversing a conviction for disorderly conduct for
an anti-war protester who said “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later” after the police cleared
protesters from the street, reasoning that there was “no evidence” that the speech was “intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder”).
78. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 1001 (1988).
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not directed to a specific individual or group, or when the illegal activity is
advocated “at some indefinite future time.”79
3.

Fighting Words

States may also prohibit “fighting words” without violating the First
Amendment.80 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court defined
“fighting words” as words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”81 But in every case addressing
convictions for fighting words since the Court decided Chaplinsky in 1942,
the Court has reversed the conviction.82 In these subsequent cases, the Court
has also greatly limited the fighting words doctrine.83 Today, it only applies
to speech directed at another person that is “inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction”84—it does not apply to words that tend to inflict emotional
harm.85 Furthermore, the Court often declares laws prohibiting fighting
words unconstitutional because they are either too broad or too narrow.86
The result is that today “[t]he fighting words exception is very limited” and
rarely used.87
4.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

Even when speech is protected under the First Amendment, the state
may place restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the speech.88 The
state may prohibit or limit speech on government property that is not open
to the public as long as the place is one that the state may properly close to
public access, the restriction on speech is reasonable, and the restriction
applies regardless of the viewpoint being expressed.89 These regulations
prevent speech activity that obstructs government officials from conducting
79. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
80. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
81. Id.
82. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1347-48.
83. Id.
84. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
85. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1347-48.
86. Id. Statutes are considered overbroad when they ban the use of non-fighting
words or when they are not specific enough as to what words are banned. Id. Statutes are too
narrow when they are considered “content-based” restrictions because they ban some speech
based purely on the content of the speech rather than banning fighting words in a way that is
“content neutral.” Id. “Content neutrality” is discussed below with “time, place, and manner”
restrictions. See infra Part II.B.4.
87. Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997).
88. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
89. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78, 682 (1998).
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their daily business and ensure that government property remains available
to be used for its intended purpose.90
Even in public forums—the types of government property where
speech is the most protected, including public parks and streets—the state
may restrict the time, place, and manner of speech.91 This allows the state to
protect important interests including public order, health, safety, welfare,
and convenience.92
Time, place, and manner restrictions must generally be “content neutral.”93 A restriction is content neutral if it applies to all speech regardless of
its content.94 The requirement of content neutrality prevents government
officials from controlling the range of public discourse by banning speech
they do not like and allowing speech they favor, which tends to give voice
to those who support government policies while silencing critics.95 Contentbased restrictions, which restrict speech based on its content, are strictly
scrutinized by the Court.96 Strict scrutiny means that time, place, and manner restrictions based on the content of the speech are only allowed when
regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and narrowly
tailored for that purpose.97 By requiring the restriction to be “necessary”
and “narrowly tailored,” the First Amendment only allows such regulation
when the state cannot achieve its compelling interest in any less restrictive
way and ensures the state’s restriction is not so broad that it bans additional
speech superfluously.98 In practice, strict scrutiny means the First Amendment bans virtually all content-based time, place, and manner restrictions.99
The state may place content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, wherever the speech occurs, when it can meet the lower burden of intermediate scrutiny.100 This means the restriction must be
reasonable, must be narrowly tailored to an important government interest,
and must leave the speaker with adequate alternative ways to communicate

90. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
91. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
92. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
93. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648.
94. Id.
95. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
96. Id.
97. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
98. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815-17 (2000).
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1540. Chemerinsky notes that there are exceptions to this rule, though. Id. (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (applying strict
scrutiny and upholding a content-based restriction banning people from distributing campaign literature within 100 feet of a polling place)).
100. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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his or her message within the forum in question.101 Strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny differ in several significant ways. Unlike strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny does not contain the “necessary” requirement.102 Additionally, although both strict and intermediate scrutiny require the restriction on speech be “narrowly tailored,” this language is interpreted differently under intermediate scrutiny.103 This means the state may apply content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions even when they are not the
least restrictive means available to accomplish the government interest.104
Finally, a compelling government interest is a significantly higher standard
than an important government interest, which means the state does not have
to assert as vital an interest in order to uphold a content-neutral time, place,
and manner restriction.105
As demonstrated in Part II, the First Amendment allows the state to
place significant limitations on speech in the public interest. Most speech
that poses a real danger can be banned under the true threat doctrine or the
Brandenburg test for speech inciting illegal activity.106 Sexually explicit
speech may be banned if it constitutes obscenity or child pornography.107
The First Amendment also gives the state a good deal of discretion in regulating the time, place, and manner of speech in a content-neutral way when
such regulations serve the public interest.108 Keeping in mind the restrictions on speech allowed under the full First Amendment standard, I
now turn to the special restrictions on speech allowed in a school setting
under the more limited First Amendment protection of speech that applies
in public secondary schools.
III.
A.

THE STUDENT SPEECH STANDARD: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
FOR ON-CAMPUS SPEECH
TINKER V. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

In Tinker, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that neither students nor
teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”109 The Court gave several reasons why the right to
freedom of speech in schools is important, including its role in educating
101. See id.; Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647-48 (1981).
102. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
103. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 & n.6 (1989).
104. Id. at 800.
105. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
106. See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
107. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
108. See supra Part II.B.4.
109. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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students for citizenship110 and promoting the marketplace of ideas.111 Yet,
because it is necessary to maintain order and discipline within schools so
that schools may accomplish their educational mission, courts properly give
deference to the expertise of school officials as to the best way to achieve
educational goals and maintain order and discipline at school.112
Accounting for the unique characteristics of the school environment,
the Supreme Court in Tinker effectively created a separate First Amendment standard for speech occurring in public schools that allows for greater
regulation of speech than the full First Amendment standard.113 The Tinker
Court held that, in the school setting, school officials may discipline students for speech that causes, or can be reasonably forecast to cause, “substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.”114
Tinker involved students wearing armbands to school as a form of silent
protest against the Vietnam War.115 Since Tinker dealt with school discipline for on-campus speech, it did not clearly address the issue of how
schools may handle speech that occurs off campus.116
B.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON STUDENT SPEECH AFTER TINKER

The Supreme Court elaborated on the school speech standard by allowing greater restrictions on student speech in three subsequent cases, but
none of these cases directly addressed the issue of whether, or to what extent, schools may discipline students for off-campus speech.117 In Bethel
School District v. Fraser, a school disciplined a student for his use of lewd
language in a nominating speech delivered during a school assembly.118 The
Court found that the First Amendment allowed discipline in this situation,
holding that schools may discipline students for lewd, vulgar, and indecent
speech even when there is insufficient evidence that school activities were
substantially disrupted to satisfy the requirements of Tinker.119 The Court
110. Id. at 507 (“[E]ducating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))).
111. Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
112. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1576.
113. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 513-14.
114. Id. at 514.
115. Id. at 504, 508, 514. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence to show
that the students’ speech caused substantial disruption and found that the speech was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 514.
116. Id. at 504.
117. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
118. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
119. See id. at 685-86.
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reasoned that schools have an educational mission to teach shared social
values, including the appropriate form of civil discourse and mature conduct, and that school officials could reasonably conclude that allowing
lewd, vulgar, and indecent speech would contradict this educational mission.120 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan clarified that the student
could not have been disciplined by the school if he had given the same
speech outside of school.121 Intuitively this makes sense because holding
otherwise would appear to allow school officials to discipline secondary
school students for using language that is inappropriate for school even
when they use such language outside of the school setting.122 As a result,
courts and commentators generally agree that Fraser does not apply to offcampus speech.123
120. Id. at 683, 685.
121. See id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Morse v. Frederick, the Court also
stated that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school
context, it would have been protected.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
122. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir.
2011) (“[T]o apply the Fraser standard to [off-campus speech would] allow[] school officials to punish any speech by a student that takes place anywhere, at any time, as long as it is
about the school or a school official . . . and is deemed ‘offensive’ by the prevailing authority.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
123. See, e.g., id. at 932-33; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 45758 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97,
130 (2010). Joseph A. Tomain, a visiting assistant professor of law at the University of
Louisville Brandeis School of Law, notes that although courts have held that Fraser does not
apply to off-campus speech not communicated via the internet, courts have been somewhat
inconsistent on the question of whether Fraser applies to off-campus internet speech.
Tomain, supra. Tomain correctly points to the fact that some courts have failed to clearly
acknowledge that Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech or have even applied Fraser
to such speech. He suggests that this lack of certainty by the courts creates the danger that
Fraser may be applied to off-campus speech in the future, and he argues persuasively that
Fraser should not be applied to off-campus speech. See id. at 130-59. Most of the cases
Tomain cites, however, either involve courts simply engaging in judicial restraint to avoid a
ruling on the question of whether Fraser applies to off-campus speech, see, e.g., Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2008), or simply holding that Fraser applies to internet
speech that the court has found to be on-campus speech, see J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865, 867-68 (Pa. 2002) (holding that there was a sufficient
nexus between the speech and the school to consider the speech on campus and then going
on to apply Fraser in addition to Tinker, but also exercising judicial restraint to refuse to
decide whether Fraser or Tinker was the proper standard to decide the case since the court
found both standards to be met). Tomain only points to two cases where courts have held
that Fraser applies to off-campus speech. One, the district court decision in J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, see J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), was vacated by the circuit
court and replaced with a clear decision that Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech
since the time of Tomain’s writing, see J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
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In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court held that
schools may exercise “editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored [publications]” provided any regulations on
such speech are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”124
To justify granting school officials more control over the content of schoolsponsored publications, the Court pointed to a school’s need to control messages disseminated in the school’s name to prevent student statements from
being falsely attributed to the school.125 The Court also noted the need of
schools to make sure that readers of school-sponsored publications are not
exposed to material that is inappropriate for their maturity level, to ensure
that the educational goals of the school activity that produces the publication are achieved, and to teach shared social and cultural values.126
The Court added one additional restriction on student speech in Morse
v. Frederick—it allowed schools to prohibit student speech that could reasonably be viewed as promoting the use of illegal drugs.127 In Morse, a
school suspended a student for ten days for displaying a banner that read
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored event.128 The Court found
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). The other, the district court
decision in Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d on other
grounds, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), was affirmed on other grounds by the Second Circuit,
which affirmed the case under Tinker and indicated that “[i]t is not clear . . . that Fraser
applies to off-campus speech” and “[w]e . . . need not decide whether [Fraser] appl[ies]”
even though the district court had decided the case under Fraser. See Doninger v. Niehoff,
527 F.3d 41, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2008). In affirming the district court’s judgment, the Second
Circuit expressly stated, “we acknowledge that the district court did not expressly rely on
Tinker . . . . We nevertheless may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground appearing in the record, even if the ground is different from the one relied on by the district court.”
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, although
Tomain correctly points to some inconsistency on the issue in order to make important arguments addressing the threat of Fraser being extended to off-campus speech, it now seems
clear that there is widespread agreement among courts and commentators that Fraser does
not apply to off-campus speech. There is, however, significant inconsistency over how to
define internet speech as on campus or off campus. Presently, the main danger is that courts
will apply Fraser to internet speech after improperly finding the speech to be on-campus
speech, resulting in Fraser being applied to speech that should be considered off-campus
speech. When this occurs, though, it does not add any support to the proposition that Fraser
applies to off-campus speech—it actually affirms that Fraser only applies to on-campus
speech when courts apply Fraser only after finding the speech to be on-campus speech.
124. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
125. Id. at 271.
126. Id. at 271-72.
127. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396, 403 (2007).
128. Id. at 396-98. The event was the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay. Since the Torch
Relay was set to pass along the street in front of the school during school hours, the school
arranged to allow students to watch the relay from both sides of the street as a schoolsponsored and school-supervised event or fieldtrip. Id. at 396-98, 400-01. Therefore, even
though the student was not on school property when he displayed the banner, he was under
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that the banner could reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal drug use.129
The Court also noted that preventing drug abuse by students was a significant governmental interest and made a point of mentioning that the banner
was not intended to convey a serious political or religious message.130
In these cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that there is a different
standard for freedom of speech in public schools that is designed to account
for the special circumstances of the school setting.131 Speech that occurs in
a school setting is subject to restrictions that do not apply outside of school.
Schools have the most control over student speech in school-sponsored
publications, which schools may regulate as long as their regulations are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Schools may also
ban certain limited categories of speech containing content that is inappropriate for the school setting—namely, lewd, vulgar, or indecent speech, and
speech reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. Outside these narrowly enumerated categories for specific types of speech, Tinker appears to
be the general rule, which means that schools may prohibit speech when the
speech causes, or can reasonably be forecast to cause, substantial disruption
of school activities.132
The Supreme Court has only applied these rules in addressing speech
that occurred on campus or under a school’s supervision and control—it has
not directly decided the issue of whether, or to what extent, the school
speech standard articulated in Tinker, Fraser, and Morse applies to offcampus speech or speech occurring outside the school’s supervision and
the school’s supervision and control so that his speech was properly treated as on-campus
speech. See id. at 400-01 (“[A student] cannot stand in the midst of his fellow students,
during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Court treated this entirely as a case of on-campus speech and
did not hold that off-campus speech was subject to regulation under a student-speech standard. See id.
129. Id. at 401-02.
130. Id. at 402-03, 407-09.
131. See supra Parts III.A-B.
132. Mark W. Cordes, a law professor at Northern Illinois University College of
Law, however, argues that, when the majority opinion is considered with the concurring
opinions and previous rulings of the Court, Morse appears to suggest a balancing test that
takes into account the strength of the asserted state interest, the centrality of the speech to
core First Amendment values, and the type of restriction placed on the speech. He theorizes
that the Court may allow other types of student speech, in addition to the types enumerated
in Fraser and Morse, to be restricted if this test is met. He also suggests that the Court indicated that this test would be very protective of political speech but might allow further restrictions on speech that is not at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect if the state has a strong interest in regulating it. As an example, Cordes points to speech
reasonably viewed as promoting violence as a type of speech that the Court may allow
schools to prohibit. Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v.
Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 660, 701-04 (2009).
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control.133 While the rules of Tinker, Fraser, and Morse make sense when
applied in the school setting because they balance students’ right to freedom of speech with the educational mission of schools, these rules place
troubling restrictions on the freedom of speech when applied outside the
school setting.134
IV.

LIMITS ON SCHOOL AUTHORITY OVER ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH
OCCURRING OFF CAMPUS

It is widely agreed that there should be limits on public school authority over students. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the First
Amendment limits school authority over student speech.135 Beyond this, it
only makes sense that school authority should be limited to student speech
or conduct that has some connection with the school or school-related activities. Even if there is general agreement that school authority should only be
exercised in accord with the First Amendment and should only be applied
to student speech with some connection to the school, courts and commentators disagree over which First Amendment standard should apply and
what kind of connection to the school is needed.136 In addressing these issues, it is important to distinguish school authority over speech that constitutes a true threat from school authority over other kinds of speech. Schools
should have greater authority over true threats than other speech. Therefore,
I will address true threats separately before turning to other student speech.
A.

LIMITS ON SCHOOL AUTHORITY OVER TRUE THREATS

One of the strongest government interests in the school context is
school safety.137 For this reason, courts may be justified in giving more
deference to the decisions of school administrators on matters relating to
school safety than the deference courts already give to school administrators regarding matters of school discipline.138 Since speech that incites illegal conduct and speech that constitutes a true threat are already considered
133. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
134. See supra Parts III.A-B; infra Parts IV.B.1-2.
135. See supra Part III.
136. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
137. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)
(stating that schools may ban on-campus speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs because it “presents a grave . . . threat to the physical safety of students”); id. at 439 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (recognizing a “school’s concededly powerful interest in protecting its students”).
138. See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 627 (8th Cir. 2002);
Goldman, supra note 17, at 411-12.
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unprotected speech under the full First Amendment standard, however,
arguably there is no need to extend school authority over off-campus student speech of this type.139 The true threat doctrine covers situations where
the speaker seriously intends to engage in violence, which means that it can
be invoked virtually any time a real danger of violence exists.140 Importantly, the true threat doctrine also applies when the speaker does not actually
intend to engage in the threatened act but merely intends to communicate a
serious expression of intent to do the threatened act.141 This means that students can be subject to criminal penalties for making “fake threats,” or
threatening statements without the intent to actually carry out the threat, as
long as they intend to make others believe the threat is serious.142 Therefore, the true threat doctrine would apply if a student, who had no intention
whatsoever of following through on it, made a false bomb threat or said he
or she was going to go on a shooting rampage at school simply hoping that
classes would be cancelled or disrupted (it would also apply if he or she
was only hoping to laugh about it with his or her friends) as long as the
student intended that the threat sound believable to others.143
139. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 267-68 (2001)
[hereinafter Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment] (arguing that schools
should have no authority over purely off-campus true threats and that schools should just
contact police and let them handle it if they become aware of a true threat made off campus);
Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594 n.206 (arguing that schools cannot discipline students for true
threats made outside of school supervision). Some commentators take the opposite position
that, since true threats are unprotected under the First Amendment, schools should have
authority to discipline students for true threats wherever they occur. See, e.g., Goldman,
supra note 17, at 412.
140. See supra Part II.B.1.
141. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). Some courts have also
applied the true threat doctrine in cases where a reasonable person would interpret the
speaker’s comments as a serious expression of intent to engage in violence, even if the
speaker did not actually intend to communicate a serious expression of intent to engage in
violence. See, e.g., In re A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶¶ 22-23, 626 N.W.2d 712. These courts have
probably incorrectly interpreted Virginia v. Black. In Virginia v. Black, the Court appeared
to require that the speaker actually intend to communicate a serious expression of intent to
do harm. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359. Furthermore, subjecting someone who did not intend to
engage in the illegal conduct to criminal liability violates time-honored principles of criminal law. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(c) (1962) (stating that criminal offenses should
be defined so as to “safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal”). Since someone could be subject to criminal liability for making a true threat, it is
questionable whether they should essentially be held to a negligence standard of intent based
on how a “reasonable person” would perceive the threat rather than based on their actual
intent in making the allegedly threatening comment. See id. Whatever the law is (or should
be) on this issue, it is only of marginal relevance to this Comment since none of my arguments depend on the state of the law with respect to this point.
142. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
143. See id.
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When the true threat doctrine applies, the First Amendment does not
provide a defense to criminal charges for the threatening speech.144 The
question then becomes whether a student who would be subject to criminal
charges under state law for making threats can also be disciplined by his or
her school. If the true threat occurs on campus or at a school-sponsored
event, it is clear a school could discipline a student for the threat since the
student could not raise a First Amendment defense as a shield against his or
her unprotected speech, and the school clearly has the authority to discipline students for unprotected speech that occurs on campus.145 Under certain circumstances, current law would also allow school administrators to
discipline students for threatening speech that falls short of a true threat
when that threatening speech occurs on campus.146
The extent of school authority over threatening speech that occurs off
campus is less clear. If off-campus threatening speech does not satisfy the
true threat doctrine or the Brandenburg test, schools should not have any
authority to discipline students for it.147 If, however, speech does qualify as
a true threat, courts have usually held that schools can discipline students
for it even when it is purely off-campus speech.148 Since true threats are
144. See supra Part II.B.1.
145. See supra Part III.
146. See supra Part III. A school can argue for applying Fraser, Tinker, or Morse to
such on-campus speech. Fraser applies to lewd, vulgar, and “indecent” speech, and threatening speech should probably be considered “indecent” or vulgar. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). Furthermore, Tinker would apply to any speech that causes, or could be reasonably forecast to cause, substantial disruption to school activities.
Threatening speech, even if it is obvious to the speaker and any reasonable listener that the
threat is not serious, could possibly either cause substantial disruption or be reasonably
forecast to cause substantial disruption when it occurs at school. Additionally, at least one
scholar has suggested that, after the decision in Morse, the Supreme Court might allow
schools to discipline students for speech reasonably viewed as promoting violence, which
would give schools seeking to discipline threatening speech that does not qualify as a true
threat another argument to use with a good chance of success in court. See Cordes, supra
note 132, at 701-04.
147. Some courts have allowed schools to apply Tinker to discipline students for offcampus threatening speech that does not satisfy the true threat doctrine or the Brandenburg
test when the speech causes, or could reasonably be forecast to cause, substantial disruption
at the school. See infra Part IV.B. As demonstrated below, this is an improper use of Tinker.
Aside from any controversy over the issue of applying Tinker to discipline students for offcampus threatening speech that causes substantial disruption, there is general agreement that
schools cannot discipline students for off-campus threatening speech unless it is unprotected
under the full First Amendment standard (i.e., unless it satisfies the true threat doctrine or
Brandenburg test). The Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker that student speech is protected
under the First Amendment dictates this result. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 509 (1969).
148. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619-27 (8th Cir.
2002) (upholding school discipline for a student who wrote a letter while off campus (and
kept it in his home, where a friend took it without his permission and showed it to others)
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unprotected under the First Amendment, it is correct that the First Amendment itself would not prevent schools from disciplining students for this
type of off-campus speech.149
This should raise a separate issue that is not actually a First Amendment issue—the limits of school authority and the extent of school jurisdiction into the general community.150 Geographic and temporal limits on
school authority are important for a variety of reasons, including allowing
parents and the general community to handle off-campus matters regarding
child-rearing and civil and criminal law, and preventing school policy from
being applied in a way that limits freedom of speech and action outside of
the school campus.151 Assuming that school authority should be limited,
arguably school administrators should simply contact parents and the police
when they learn of off-campus threats by students and allow the parents and
authorities to handle the situation instead of applying school rules to discipline students for off-campus conduct.152 But in the interest of promoting
school safety, an alternative approach—one that allows schools to discipline students for certain conduct, in the purported interest of increasing
after finding the letter to constitute a true threat without considering whether the school had
authority over this off-campus speech). As of the time of this writing, only one court in only
one case has upheld school discipline for off-campus internet speech rising to the level of a
true threat. See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 756-59, 761,
764-65 (8th Cir. 2011); Emrick, supra note 17, at 801 (writing two years before D.J.M. was
decided and stating that no court had found a true threat from off-campus cyberspeech). This
is the case even though off-campus internet speech issues have been raised under Tinker and
the true threat doctrine for years now in many courts. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856, 860-62 (Pa. 2002). Perhaps there are multiple reasons
for this. One reason is probably that most students simply do not post true threats on the
internet if they really intend to carry out acts of violence. Another is that most material on
the internet simply does not rise to the level of a threat that a reasonable person would take
seriously. Additionally, material posted on the internet is not likely to be a true threat since it
does not usually directly communicate a threat to its target. See supra Part II.B.1. All of this
may suggest that the issue of whether schools should be allowed to discipline students for
off-campus true threats communicated via websites may be more of a theoretical concern
than a practical one. Yet, if most material posted off campus on the internet is relatively
innocuous, it may be a very important freedom of speech issue to address this question in
order to prevent innocuous speech from being restricted more than necessary and the chilling
effect that could result from schools disciplining students for internet speech.
149. See supra Part II.B.1.
150. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139.
151. These and other reasons for limiting school authority are fully discussed below.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
152. Some commentators make this argument, stating that speech that does not occur
while a student is under a school’s supervision and control simply does not fall under school
authority and may not be regulated by the school even if it constitutes a true threat. See
Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139; Hoder, supra note
17, at 1594 n.206.
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school safety, while also limiting school authority over off-campus speech
and conduct—might be desirable.153
153. Arguably, increasing security may not be a very good reason for limiting fundamental personal freedoms including the freedom of speech. See, e.g., Benjamin F.
Heidlage, Note, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 607 (2009). This is especially true if it is the case that, as one commentator stated, innocent expression by many students is being stifled to make it easier to target
a tiny fraction of students who actually represent a danger. Clay Calvert, Free Speech and
Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse
Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 763 (2000) [hereinafter Calvert, Free Speech and
Public Schools]. Even if it is worth it to limit freedom of speech to increase school safety,
the argument that allowing schools to discipline students for true threats that occur off campus will increase school security is a weak one. See, e.g., Heidlage, supra. Students in the
general community are already deterred from making statements constituting true threats (or
even statements that might appear to others to be true threats) by the potential for consequences much more serious than school discipline. Potential consequences include the following: criminal sanctions that could result in jail time and/or fines, civil liability, a police
investigation (which could result in inconveniences such as a search of the suspect’s home or
person, or even a compulsory psychiatric exam with the possibility of involuntary commitment), and the reprobation of members of the community, not to mention the option of parental discipline, which could serve as a greater deterrent for some students than school
discipline. See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 759,
763-66 (8th Cir. 2011) (recounting the story of a student who was required to undergo a
psychiatric evaluation and subsequently placed in a psychiatric hospital and then juvenile
detention based on an investigation into threatening instant messages he sent from his home
computer to another student’s home computer—in this case the court did find a true threat);
Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting
that community hostility led to a student and his family moving out of the town after he sent
an allegedly threatening instant message to fifteen of his friends that police investigators
concluded was meant as a joke); Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment,
supra note 139, at 246-51 (discussing J.S. ex rel. H.S., where a middle school student was
sued under four tort theories and investigated by the FBI and local police after posting an
allegedly threatening website that was eventually determined not to be a true threat). Given
this, it is unlikely that the risk of facing school discipline will play a significant role in a
student’s calculation as to whether to make such a threat. Heidlage, supra, at 607 & n.169
(citing Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools, supra, at 762-65). Even if the additional
deterrence resulting from school discipline would stop some students from making threatening statements, this would arguably have no effect on violence; students might just be more
likely to keep their violent intentions to themselves until they act on them. See Heidlage,
supra, at 607. Some commentators have in fact argued that it would be better not to deter
threatening statements because the online statements actually make it easier for parents,
school administrators, and law enforcement officials to identify threats of violence and prevent the actual acts of violence from occurring through various forms of intervention. See,
e.g., id. Finally, several commentators have pointed out that school violence is actually quite
rare and suggested that fears of school violence are greatly disproportionate to actual incidents of school violence. See, e.g., Robert D. Richard & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout:
The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV.
1089, 1110 & n.152 (2003) (citing John Leland, Zero Tolerance Changes Life at One
School, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, § 9 (Sunday Styles), at 1 (noting that school violence is so
rare that students are three times more likely to be struck by lightning than killed through
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Currently, courts tend to simply apply the true threat doctrine in cases
of school discipline for threatening off-campus speech and uphold the
school discipline if the student’s off-campus speech constitutes a true
threat.154 This approach fails to appropriately limit school jurisdiction.155 As
an alternative approach, courts should require a significant connection between the off-campus threatening speech and the school before applying the
true threat doctrine to uphold school discipline.
A sufficient nexus approach might be appropriate here.156 Ideally,
courts would use such an approach to allow schools to discipline students
who say, while off campus, that they will engage in acts of violence at
school, assuming that these students intend that their threat sound believable to others. Using a sufficient nexus test should also prevent schools from
disciplining students for believable threats that are completely unrelated to
the school.
A more comprehensive analysis of how courts have applied the true
threat doctrine in cases involving school discipline and a more detailed description of the type of connection that courts should require are outside the
scope of this Comment. Moving forward, it would be a step in the right
direction if courts simply began to consider, as a threshold consideration,
whether there is a sufficient connection between the school and the threatening speech before allowing schools to use the true threat doctrine to disacts of violence occurring at school)); Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 112-19 (2003)
(discussing fears of school violence and teenage internet use as examples of moral panic,
which involves a social consensus around an irrational and exaggerated fear of an activity
that creates a disproportionate repressive response against the activity). Therefore, it is important to consider the extent to which legal measures to restrict student speech are truly
justified by actual circumstances rather than simply being kneejerk reactions to phantom
fears. Although I agree it is true that fears of school violence are greatly exaggerated in
proportion to the actual number of violent incidents and that school discipline for offcampus threats is unlikely to increase school safety, I believe the U.S. Constitution should
not be interpreted to completely preclude the option of schools disciplining students for offcampus true threats that are directed at the school. Whether it is wise for Congress, state
legislatures, or schools to adopt laws and/or policies allowing disciplinary measures for offcampus true threats is another matter.
154. See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 756-59,
761, 764-65 (8th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619-27
(8th Cir. 2002).
155. See supra note 154.
156. Some courts already use a sufficient nexus test to determine if there is enough
connection with the speech to treat off-campus speech as on campus for the purpose of Tinker. See infra Part IV.B.1.d. This is improper because Tinker should not be used to regulate
off-campus speech that is protected under the full First Amendment standard. See infra Part
IV.B. But such a test may be proper for determining if unprotected speech (such as a true
threat) occurring off campus has enough connection to a school for the school to have disciplinary authority. See supra Part IV.A.
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cipline students for off-campus speech. Regardless of the specific test used,
this simple step would have the effect of properly limiting school jurisdiction without taking away any potential benefits to school safety that may be
achieved through applying school discipline to threats directed at schools.
B.

LIMITS ON THE APPLICATION OF TINKER TO ONLINE SPEECH

As this Comment shifts from true threats to other forms of speech, it is
important to note the distinction. Regardless of whether a school may discipline a particular student for a true threat, the student would be subject to
criminal penalties because true threats are not protected under the First
Amendment.157 But, speech that is allegedly merely offensive, indecent,
lewd, or vulgar (but not obscene, and not falling into some other category
of unprotected speech) would be protected from state sanctions by the First
Amendment if the speech occurred outside of a school setting.158 The only
argument for applying state sanctions (i.e., school discipline) to such speech
is that school speech rules should apply to allow the speech to be regulated.159 Therefore, the issue becomes whether speech that is protected under
the First Amendment when it occurs outside of the school context can be
subject to school discipline under a school speech standard based on some
kind of connection between the speech and the school.
There appears to be a general consensus that Fraser and Morse only
apply to on-campus speech or speech occurring under school supervision.160
No such consensus has emerged with respect to Tinker. The Supreme Court
has not decided a case involving school discipline for off-campus speech,161
so lower courts, without firm guidance by the Court, employ a variety of
approaches on the issue of whether and when Tinker applies to off-campus
speech.162 Although courts are split on the issue, most scholars argue that
Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.163 The key question that divides those who believe that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech is
when internet speech should be considered on campus and when it should

157. See supra Part II.B.1.
158. See supra Part II.
159. See supra Part III.
160. See supra Part III.B, particularly note 123 and accompanying text.
161. See Emrick, supra note 17, at 790.
162. See infra Parts IV.B.1.a-f.
163. See, e.g., Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School
Cyberbullying Policies and the Potential Threat to Students’ Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. L.
REV. 283, 285, 320 (2008); Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra
note 139, at 252-53; Goldman, supra note 17, at 406-10, 423-25; Leora Harpaz, Internet
Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 2000 B.Y.U. EDUC. &
L.J. 123, 153-63 (2000); Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1090-93.
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be considered off campus.164 This Subpart begins by reviewing the major
approaches courts and commentators have taken on whether and when
Tinker applies to off-campus speech.
1.

Tests to Determine When Tinker Applies to Internet Speech
i.

Tinker Always Applies to Internet Speech

Some courts have applied Tinker to all cases of student discipline for
internet speech where Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse do not apply.165 In
some cases, courts have simply done a Tinker analysis as a way of covering
all bases166 or as a way of avoiding the issue of whether Tinker applies to
off-campus speech (by assuming for the sake of argument that Tinker applies to decide the case based on a lack of substantial disruption).167 Some
courts,168 and at least one commentator,169 have gone further and assumed
164. See infra Parts IV.B.1.d-f.
165. See infra Part IV.B.1.a, particularly notes 166-68.
166. See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370-74 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (starting with the issue of where the speech occurred and finding it to have occurred off campus,
but subsequently doing a substantial disruption analysis and concluding that the speech was
protected “[r]egardless of the standard used”); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F.
Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (discussing whether there was substantial disruption
and holding that there was not after suggesting that Tinker does not apply to off-campus
speech and finding the student’s website to be off-campus speech).
167. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 &
n.3, 931 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. SmithGreen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 781 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
168. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220
& n.2, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (implying that Tinker should always
apply by lauding the merits of Tinker as a test that balances school order with student speech
rights and by stating that whenever school officials can show substantial disruption courts
“ought to be supportive of their reasonable efforts to maintain appropriate order,” although
disclaiming that “[w]hether the test framed by Tinker will always be applicable is not a
matter to be answered in the abstract”); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist.,
711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[U]nder the majority rule, and the rule
established by the Ninth circuit . . . the geographic origin of the speech is not material; Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech.”); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205
F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-801 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that Fraser did not apply when a student was disciplined for a website he created at home and privately viewed at school (although the student did show the website to another student, the school did not know this
when it disciplined the student, so the court did not consider that evidence), but then appearing to assume that Tinker applied simply because Fraser did not apply). The J.C. ex rel. R.C.
court cited LaVine v. Blaine School District, 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001), as establishing the rule that “Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech.” J.C. ex rel.
R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1108-09. The court in Lavine did state the following:
In deciding whether school officials have infringed a student’s First
Amendment rights, we must first determine what type of student speech
is at issue. . . . (1) [V]ulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech
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that Tinker should always apply to student discipline issues whether the
speech in question occurred on or off campus.
Sometimes this view appears to result from the desire to apply a more
speech-protective test to internet speech.170 Proponents of this line of thinking view Tinker as the best standard for internet speech because Tinker provides more protection for speech than Fraser (since Tinker requires a showing of substantial disruption even for lewd, vulgar, and indecent speech
while such speech may be restricted under Fraser without any proof of disruption).171 But, this ignores the fact that courts need not apply a student
speech standard to off-campus speech, which would receive greater protection under a full First Amendment standard than it does under Tinker.172
The best argument in favor of an approach that always applies Tinker
is that Tinker already balances a school’s interest in maintaining a disruption-free environment with a student’s right to free speech because it ensures students have free speech rights, but it still allows schools to regulate
student speech that could be reasonably forecast to cause a disruption at
school.173 This argument is premised on the purported difficulty or arbitrariness of distinguishing between on- and off-campus internet speech and on
the belief that off-campus student internet speech poses a significant risk of
disrupting school activities.174 These are both dubious propositions.175
is governed by Fraser; (2) school-sponsored speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into neither of these categories is governed by Tinker. [The speech at issue in this case] clearly falls within the
third category.
LaVine, 257 F.3d at 988-89 (citation omitted).
Although this language in LaVine could be interpreted as suggesting that Tinker applies as a
default standard to all speech that Fraser and Kuhlmeier do not cover, this is probably not
the best interpretation of the case. See id. Since LaVine involved discipline of a student for
the content of a poem that he brought to campus and shared with a teacher (and several other
students) during school, the case only involved an issue of on-campus speech. See id. at 984.
The LaVine court did not explicitly state that Tinker applies to off-campus speech, and its
holding that Tinker is the default standard is best interpreted as being limited to on-campus
speech—anything more could only be dicta at most. See id. at 984, 988-89. As demonstrated
below, it is also not clear that the J.C. ex rel. R.C. court is correct that the majority rule is
that Tinker applies to all speech whether on or off campus. See J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F.
Supp. 2d at 1108-09.
169. See Sandy S. Li, Comment, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 97-100,
102-05 (2005).
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., id.
172. See id.
173. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220-22 (Jordan, J., concurring); Li,
supra note 169, at 104.
174. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220-22 (Jordan, J., concurring); Li,
supra note 169, at 104.
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ii. Impact Analysis Test
Some commentators have suggested altering or abandoning Tinker for
a less speech-protective test as a measure to combat cyberbullying.176 Renee
L. Servance, former J.D. candidate at the University of Wisconsin, has suggested replacing a Tinker analysis with a three-prong “impact analysis” test.
That test would consider (1) whether the speaker and the target are both
“members of the same school community,” (2) whether “the speech has an
actual or foreseeable negative impact on the targeted individual,” and (3)
whether the speech’s impact disrupts the school’s classroom authority or its
“ability to . . . educate students.”177 The purpose of this test appears to be
getting courts to consider the impact of the speech rather than where it occurred178 and, according to one commentator, allowing schools to regulate
speech that may not rise to the level of substantial disruption because it
only impacts a small number of students.179 Another commentator has suggested using this impact analysis test but altering it to make it more speech
protective by giving greater protection to speech commenting on social or
political issues.180 As of the time of this writing, it does not appear that any
court has applied a student speech standard that is less speech protective
than Tinker to off-campus internet speech.181 Cyberbullying is a serious
concern, but there are alternative methods of dealing with that problem that
are less restrictive on the fundamental constitutional right to freedom of
speech and that may be more beneficial for all actors involved, including
schools, parents, and students.182
iii. Reasonable Foreseeability Test
One approach that has gained significant traction in the courts is the
reasonable foreseeability test, which has been used as a theory to uphold
school discipline for off-campus internet speech in the Second and Eighth
175. See infra Parts IV.B.2-4.
176. See Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 271-72, 285-86
(2008); Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1238-44 (2003).
177. Servance, supra note 176, at 1239.
178. See id. at 1238-44.
179. Erb, supra note 176, at 285.
180. Id.
181. The only exception is that some courts have considered applying the less
speech-protective rule from Fraser. This has been almost universally rejected as a test for
off-campus internet speech. See supra Part III.B, particularly note 123 and accompanying
text.
182. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
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Circuits.183 The key case supporting this theory is Wisniewski ex rel.
Wisniewski v. Board of Education, where the Second Circuit adopted the
reasonable foreseeability approach.184
In Wisniewski, a middle school student, Aaron Wisniewski, sent an
AOL instant message from his home computer to fifteen members of his
“buddy list,” which included students from his school.185 Within a messaging icon, Wisniewski included a drawing depicting a gun firing a bullet at a
person’s head with the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” (his English teacher).186 The icon was viewable for three weeks.187 One of the students who
received the message showed school staff members the icon, and the school
administration called the police.188 The police started a criminal investigation that included an evaluation of Wisniewski by a psychologist.189 Ultimately, the police closed the case without criminal charges after concluding
that the icon was meant as a joke and that Wisniewski posed no real threat
to any school staff.190
The school suspended Wisniewski for one semester, and his parents
challenged the suspension in court, claiming it violated Wisniewski’s First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.191 The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, and the parents appealed.192
Even though the issue of whether Wisniewski’s message constituted a
true threat was raised and contested by the parties, the Second Circuit chose
to skip the true threat analysis and decide the case based on a Tinker analysis.193 The court held that Tinker applied because “it was reasonably foreseeable that the [instant messaging] icon would come to the attention of
school authorities.”194 It reasoned that Wisniewski’s “distribution” of the
icon to his “buddies,” who were students that might pass the icon on, made
it foreseeable that the icon would eventually come to the attention of the
school administration.195 The court also held that the school could discipline
183. See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 765-66
(8th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski ex rel.
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV 085671 ODW (AJWx), 2008 WL 4396895, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
184. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
185. Id. at 35-36.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 36.
188. Id.
189. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 35, 37.
192. Id. at 35.
193. Id. at 37-38.
194. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-40.
195. Id.
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Wisniewski regardless of whether he intended to communicate the icon to
school administrators.196
Several courts have cited and followed Wisniewski.197 In Doninger v.
Niehoff, the Second Circuit applied the Wisniewski approach to uphold a
school’s discipline of a student government representative who posted
comments to her blog from her home computer.198 In her blog post, she
criticized a school administrator’s decision to reschedule a concert at her
school, calling the administrator a “douchebag[]” and calling on students to
contact the administrator to “piss her off more.”199 The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that the school discipline in this case did
not violate the First Amendment because it was reasonably foreseeable that
the blog posts would come to the attention of school administrators.200
The reasonable foreseeability standard has merit insofar as it protects
some speech communicated privately off campus while allowing school
administrators to discipline students for speech that would foreseeably
reach campus.201 However, the reasonable foreseeability approach is not
without its flaws. Wisniewski and Doninger illustrate that this test is not
very speech protective if sending an instant message to fifteen friends from
home202 or making a post to a personal blog from home 203 could end up
being analyzed under a school speech standard. In practice, a court applying
the reasonable foreseeability test can find reasonable foreseeability of arrival on campus for almost any speech posted on the internet or sent via
email or instant message.204
196. Id. at 40.
197. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
198. Id. at 44-45.
199. Id.
200. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. It should be noted, however, that the standard of
review for this case was abuse of discretion and that the court limited its holding to cases
where the school’s discipline did not go beyond placing restrictions on a student’s participation in extracurricular activities. Id. at 43-44, 52-53. These factors narrow the court’s decision and suggest the possibility that the court may have reached a different outcome under a
different standard of review or if a more severe sanction, such as a suspension or an expulsion, was involved. See id.
201. See id. at 48, 50.
202. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36, 38-40.
203. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44-45, 48, 50.
204. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36, 38-40; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44-45, 48, 50;
Benjamin L. Ellison, Note, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with
On-Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809, 844 (2010) (“Because the Internet is so
readily available in school and elsewhere, it is reasonably foreseeable that once speech is on
the Internet, it will end up anywhere there is a computer and a user interested in accessing it,
including at school.”). See also D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d
754, 757-59, 765-66 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding reasonable foreseeability when a student sent
instant messages from his home computer to another student’s home computer); O.Z. v. Bd.
of Trs., No. CV 08-5671 ODW (AJWx), 2008 WL 4396895, at *1, *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9,
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iv. Sufficient Nexus Tests
All of the tests discussed to this point would allow schools to regulate
off-campus student internet speech to varying degrees.205 Other tests do not
follow this approach. Instead of allowing schools to regulate off-campus
speech, these tests limit school authority to on-campus speech. Despite this
commonality, these tests vary significantly in how they define on- and offcampus speech.206
The first approach that begins to head in this direction is called the sufficient nexus approach. Sufficient nexus tests require some kind of connection, called a “sufficient nexus,” between the speech and the school before
speech may be subject to regulation under the school speech standard.
There are various types of sufficient nexus tests.207 Most consider offcampus speech as beyond regulation and attempt to define what speech that
occurs off school property may be treated as on-campus speech for the purposes of Tinker.208 Several types of sufficient nexus tests are discussed below. They are addressed roughly in order from the least speech-protective
test to the most speech-protective test.
The least speech protective of the sufficient nexus tests does not provide much more protection for off-campus speech than the reasonable foreseeability test.209 This sufficient nexus approach would allow schools to
regulate student internet speech anytime the speech reaches the school.210
Killion v. Franklin Regional School District exemplifies this approach.211 In
Killion, a student, at home on his own time, created a “top ten list” mocking
his school’s athletic director and emailed it to other students of the school
from his personal computer.212 Another student, who was never identified,
printed his email and distributed it at school.213 The court held that “because
the [top ten] list was brought on campus, albeit by an unknown person,
Tinker applies.”214 Unlike the reasonable foreseeability approach, this suffi2008) (finding reasonable foreseeability that a YouTube video about a teacher created and
posted off campus would reach campus even though it only reached campus when the teacher found it while “googling” her own name from her home computer and then told school
administrators about the video).
205. See supra Parts IV.B.1.a-c.
206. See infra Parts IV.B.1.d-f.
207. See infra Part IV.B.1.d.
208. See infra Part IV.B.1.d.
209. Compare Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36, 38-40, with Killion v. Franklin Reg’l
Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
210. See Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 448.
213. Id. at 448-49.
214. Id. at 455.
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cient nexus approach requires the speech actually reach the school.215 Except in rare cases, however, speech usually does not come to the attention
of school administrators unless it reaches campus somehow. Therefore, in
practice, this type of sufficient nexus test may subject almost as much offcampus speech to school regulation as the reasonable foreseeability test.216
Kyle W. Brenton, former J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota, has proposed an interesting idea for a sufficient nexus test based on the
civil procedure concept of personal jurisdiction.217 If adopted, it would arguably be the next-to-least speech protective of the sufficient nexus tests
because it appears to allow schools to regulate some off-campus speech.218
He proposes that a school may regulate off-campus speech without running
afoul of the First Amendment if there are certain minimum contacts between the speech and the school or if a student purposefully avails himself
or herself of school jurisdiction over the speech, and if school jurisdiction
would satisfy an additional test balancing the interest of free speech against
the interest of school order (which Brenton, continuing the personal jurisdiction analogy, terms “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”).219 Brenton argues that reasonable foreseeability that speech would
reach the school is not enough, so his personal jurisdiction test would require a student either intend to cause harm at the school through their internet speech or avail themselves of school jurisdiction by accessing their web
content repeatedly while at school.220
Other sufficient nexus approaches offer more protection for offcampus speech. Benjamin L. Ellison, former J.D. candidate at Notre Dame
Law School, suggests a test that focuses primarily on the intent of the
speaker.221 His approach only allows schools to target “on-campus” speech,
but it allows a significant amount of off-campus speech to be considered
on-campus speech.222 He proposes that “[o]ff-campus speech should be
considered on-campus when the student intends that the speech reach the
school and the speech actually does reach the school.”223 Ellison suggests
that this intent requirement would be met if a student either encourages
215. Compare Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35-36,
38-40 (2d Cir. 2007), with Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49, 455.
216. Compare Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36, 38-40, with Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at
448-49, 455.
217. See Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public
School Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1206, 1233-36, 1238-42 (2008).
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1235, 1238-39.
221. Ellison, supra note 204, at 813, 842.
222. See id.
223. Id.

2013]

ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH

457

other students to view his or her website at school or shows others his or
her website at school. But, Ellison implies intent might not be established
by a student simply accessing his or her own site repeatedly at school without showing it to others.224
J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District illustrates a final
type of sufficient nexus approach.225 The J.S. ex rel. H.S. court indicated the
first step in analyzing a Tinker issue is to decide whether the speech occurred on or off campus.226 The problem in J.S. ex rel. H.S. was that it was
difficult to determine whether the speech was on or off campus because the
student created the website at issue off campus and then accessed the website on campus and showed it to another student.227 In resolving this issue,
the court held that “where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or
its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its
originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech.”228 This test
includes two parts: (1) the speech must be “aimed at” the school (or its
staff), and (2) the originator must either bring the speech to school or access
it at school.229 Although the “aimed at” requirement is not precisely defined, it probably includes an element of intent on the part of the student,
who must “aim” the speech at the school or its staff.230 It also requires the
originator be the one who brings the speech to campus.231 Both of these
factors make it the most speech protective of the sufficient nexus tests discussed so far.232 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Zappala criticized the majority’s approach to the Tinker issue as not speech protective
enough.233 Justice Zappala reasoned that, under Tinker, simply accessing a
website at school, without more, should not be enough to subject web content that was created off campus to regulation by school administrators.234
As illustrated above, sufficient nexus tests vary significantly in what
speech they would protect. But, they all tend to require more than reasonable foreseeability approaches by shifting the focus to actions or intentions
that transform off-campus speech into on-campus speech.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id.
See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
Id. at 863-64.
Id. at 865.
Id.
See id.
See J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 870 (Zappala, J., concurring).
See id.
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v. Relational Approach
The relational approach offers yet another angle on the issue of when
off-campus speech may be treated as on-campus speech for the purposes of
the Tinker test.235 Under this approach, Tinker only applies to speech that
occurs off campus if the speech occurs when the student is acting in his or
her role as student.236 The idea behind this approach is to move beyond a
purely geographical definition of school authority while still retaining clear
limits on such authority.237 Under this approach, school authority is based
on its relationship with the student rather than geographic location.238 Although it does not appear that any court has explicitly adopted this approach,
courts have made reference to whether students were acting as students
while engaging in off-campus speech.239 For example, in Klein v. Smith, the
court held that a student could not be disciplined for giving his teacher “the
finger” off campus in a restaurant parking lot.240 The court stated that “[t]he
conduct in question occurred . . . when [the teacher] was not associated in
any way with his duties as a teacher [and] [t]he student was not engaged in
any school activity or associated in any way with . . . his role as a student.”241 The relational approach is similar to the supervision and control
approach discussed below.
vi.

Geographic and Temporal Approaches

Most scholars appear to support an approach that, with some exceptions, grants off-campus internet speech the protection of the full First
Amendment standard and limits school authority under Tinker to internet
speech that occurs either on campus or when a student is under the school’s
supervision and control—this is a geographic and/or temporal approach
because it defines the limits of school authority in terms of location and/or
time.242 Despite this scholarship, comparatively few courts have adopted
this approach.243
235. See Heidlage, supra note 153.
236. Id. at 594.
237. Id. at 594-96.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986).
240. Id. at 1440-42.
241. Id. at 1441.
242. See, e.g., Beckstrom, supra note 163, at 285, 320; Calvert, Off-Campus Speech,
On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at 252-53; Goldman, supra note 17, at 406-10,
423-25; Harpaz, supra note 163, at 153-63; Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1090-93.
243. One Third Circuit concurring opinion and a few lower court majority opinions
directly support the proposition that Tinker does not apply to off-campus internet speech.
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936, 940 (3d Cir.
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Although those who advocate a geographic and/or temporal approach
generally believe that only the full First Amendment standard should apply
to off-campus speech, they would not simply limit school authority to
school property.244 Geographic and temporal approaches allow for a number
of exceptions to the general rule that school speech precedents do not apply
to off-campus speech.245 For example, they generally accept the holdings of
Kuhlmeier and Morse that school authority should extend to student speech
at school-sponsored events occurring off campus (and to student speech in
school-sponsored publications wherever they are created) so that schools
may regulate student speech at such events (or in such publications) under
school speech precedents.246 Additionally, most commentators who advocate geographic and temporal approaches would also allow for a number of
other situations where off-campus internet speech may be transformed into
on-campus speech through a student’s actions and/or intentions.247 As a
result, the different types of geographic and temporal approaches differ
mainly over the issue of when internet speech should be considered on
campus (or under school supervision) and, thus, subject to Tinker.248 Some
who follow a geographic or temporal approach would allow enough speech
2011) (Smith, J., concurring), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Flaherty v. Keystone
Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705-06 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that a school’s student handbook is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague if it fails to provide geographical
limits on a school’s authority to regulate speech); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d
1088, 1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that a student had substantial likelihood of success on the merits because “the speech was entirely outside the school’s supervision or control”). Some other courts have implied that Tinker does not apply to off-campus internet
speech but have left some doubt as to the certainty of this proposition. See, e.g., Evans v.
Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370-74 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (starting its Tinker analysis with the
question of whether the speech occurred on or off campus but still doing a substantial disruption analysis after finding the internet speech was off campus in an apparent attempt to
cover all bases); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (suggesting that Tinker does not apply to off-campus internet speech and finding the student’s website to be off-campus speech, but still doing a substantial disruption
analysis).
244. See supra notes 242-43; infra note 246.
245. See supra notes 242-43; infra note 246.
246. See supra notes 242-43. The dispute over whether school speech standards
apply to school-sponsored events because such events occur on campus or because such
events occur under school supervision and control is largely a semantic one, where various
commentators disagree more over language use than over any substantive differences in how
speech at school-sponsored events should be treated. Compare Calvert, Off-Campus Speech,
On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at 252-53, 271 (following a geographic on- and
off-campus approach that would allow schools to regulate speech at school-sponsored activities under student speech standards), with Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594-97 (advocating a
supervision and control approach that would allow schools to regulate speech at schoolsponsored activities under student speech standards).
247. See infra notes 251-66 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 251-66 and accompanying text.
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to fall under an exception to the general rule of full First Amendment protection for off-campus speech that their approach appears similar to the
sufficient nexus approaches discussed above.249 Others hold more strictly to
the proposition that the full First Amendment standard, and not Tinker,
should govern off-campus internet speech.250
Judge Smith’s concurrence in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
School District is probably the least speech-protective test proposed that
still qualifies as a geographic approach.251 That Judge Smith’s concurrence
articulates a geographic approach seems clear from his statement that “I
write separately to address . . . whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech
. . . . I would hold that it does not, and that the First Amendment protects
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects
speech by citizens in the community at large.”252 But, Judge Smith would
allow an exception so that “[r]egardless of its place of origin, speech intentionally directed towards a school is properly considered on-campus
speech.”253 As an example of a case where Tinker should apply because a
student intentionally directed speech at a school, Judge Smith refers to a
situation in which a student sends a “disruptive email” from off campus to
school staff.254 Regardless of the merits of this particular example, it is clear
that this test could potentially include a good deal of off-campus speech
depending on how broadly courts interpret “intentionally directed towards a
school.”255 It could be reduced almost to an intent test similar in its level of
protection for off-campus speech as the sufficient nexus approaches described above.256
Several commentators have argued for geographic and temporal approaches that are more speech protective than the J.S. ex rel. Snyder concurrence but that would still allow schools to restrict certain categories of
off-campus internet speech.257 Some exceptions to the general rule that
249. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936, 940 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
250. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1090-93.
251. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936, 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 936.
253. Id. at 940.
254. Id.
255. See id. The case of a student sending a disruptive or otherwise inappropriate
email to a teacher from an off-campus location is discussed below. See infra Part IV.B.4.c. I
argue that the key factor should be whether the email was sent to (or from) a school email
account—not whether the email was intentionally directed at a school. I argue that the
speech should be treated as on-campus speech and Tinker and Fraser should apply if it was
sent to (or from) a school email account. If it was not sent to (or from) a school email account, Tinker and Fraser should not apply. See infra Part IV.B.4.c.
256. See supra Part IV.B.1.d.
257. See infra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
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Tinker should not apply to off-campus speech that are commonly suggested
by those advocating geographic and temporal approaches include allowing
schools to regulate (under Tinker) the content of a website created off campus when a student (1) intentionally accesses the website on a school computer or distributes its content at school,258 (2) intentionally tells or encourages other students to access the website or distribute its content at
school,259 (3) intentionally communicates the content of the website using
school resources,260 or (4) intentionally communicates the content of the
website during school hours.261 The most controversial exceptions are (1)
and (2), which would apply Tinker when a student simply accesses a website created off campus at school or encourages others to do so (respectively).262 Other common exceptions include a student posting to a schoolsponsored website from off campus263 and a student engaging in speech for
the purpose of furthering academic misconduct (such as telling another student the answers to an assignment or a test while off campus).264
Aaron H. Caplan, a staff attorney for the ACLU, generally adheres
strictly to a geographic approach but suggests an interesting exception
might apply for off-campus “conduct that is directed exclusively at the
school (as opposed to the world at large), that is maliciously intended for
the purpose of disrupting school, and that has a high likelihood of succeeding in its purpose.”265 This language appears to suggest a modified form of
the Brandenburg test for inciting illegal activity for schools to use against
students who would attempt to incite school disruption from off campus.266
258. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139, at 252-53, 285; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799, 805.
259. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139, at 252-53, 285; Goldman, supra note 17, at 423-25; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799, 805.
260. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 17, at 423-25; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799,
805.
261. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 17, at 423-25; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799,
805; Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594-95.
262. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139, at 252-53, 285 (suggesting accessing a website created off campus at school may be
enough); Caplan, supra note 153, at 158 (arguing that even accessing a website created off
campus at school and fixing a typo on the website would not be enough to turn the website
into on-campus speech); Goldman, supra note 17, at 423-25 (arguing that accessing a website is not enough to turn off-campus speech into on-campus speech, and suggesting that a
student must not only access his or her website but also communicate it to others to make its
content subject to school regulation under Tinker); Emrick, supra note 17, at 799, 805 (making the same suggestion as Calvert).
263. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1091.
264. See Caplan, supra note 153, at 162.
265. Id. at 163-64.
266. See id. Caplan’s examples of situations where this test might apply include
threatening emails or calls directed at the school, “conspiring to bomb the school,” or
spreading a computer virus on school computers. Id. Such a test would probably be unneces-

462

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

In addition to disagreeing over when off-campus speech may be treated as on-campus speech under Tinker, commentators who advocate geographic and temporal approaches also differ over whether school authority
should be treated as primarily geographic or temporal in nature.267 Those
who focus on the geographic nature of school authority continue to use the
on- and off-campus distinction even while recognizing that some speech
occurring off campus, including speech at school-sponsored activities or in
school-sponsored publications, must be treated as on-campus speech.268
Those who focus on the temporal nature of school authority have started to
abandon the on- and off-campus language.269 Instead, they make a distinction between speech that occurs under school supervision and control, and
speech that occurs outside of school supervision and control.270 This approach essentially maintains that student speech standards like Tinker and
Fraser apply whenever students are under school supervision and that a full
First Amendment speech standard applies when students are not under the
supervision of schools or school staff.271 This approach more easily explains why schools should have authority over school-sponsored activities
that take place outside the physical property of the school.272 At least one
commentator who advocates a supervision and control approach has chosen
to use supervision and control language interchangeably with the geographic on- and off-campus language.273
Although the temporal approach is generally more precise, there are
good reasons to use supervision and control language interchangeably with
on- and off-campus language. One reason for this is simply that the geographic language of on and off campus is commonly used and less cumbersary if it only targeted these, though, because bomb conspiracies and releasing computer
viruses both involve conduct—not speech—which is not covered under the First Amendment, and threatening communications would likely be covered under the true threat doctrine. See id. See also supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the true threat doctrine covers threats
that someone intended people to take seriously); supra Part IV.A (arguing that schools
should have the authority to discipline students for true threats with a sufficient nexus to the
school—threatening emails and phone calls to the school would count); infra Part IV.B.4.c
(arguing that emails sent to or from school email accounts should be treated as on-campus
speech).
267. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139, at 252-53, 271 (focusing on the geographic on- and off-campus distinction in defining
the limits of school authority); Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594-97 (advocating a supervision
and control approach that defines school authority as primarily temporal in nature).
268. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139, at 252-53, 271.
269. See, e.g., Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594-97.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 397 n.8.
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some, making it difficult to avoid. There is also a substantive purpose behind using both sets of terms—school authority over student speech must
be considered to be limited by both space and time. Treating school authority as only limited by time ignores the fact that the speech of students who
skip school, leave school before it is over, or leave an extra-curricular activity may not fall under school jurisdiction even while school activities are
occurring.274 This can partly be explained by time in that school authority
over speech no longer applies starting at the time that supervision and control is terminated. But the precise point of termination of school supervision
and control when a student leaves an ongoing school activity is best defined, at least in part, as the time when a student puts a certain amount of
physical space between himself or herself and the school activity. Therefore, school authority over speech is best understood as being defined by
space and time. Use of both terms reminds readers of this and also
acknowledges that both the geographic and temporal approaches have the
same general goal of placing appropriate limits on school authority.
2.

Reasons Tinker Should Not Apply to Off-Campus Speech
i.

It Is Unnecessary to Apply Tinker to Off-Campus Speech

In a landmark decision, the Tinker Court declared that students have a
right to freedom of speech on campus in public schools.275 In upholding this
right, the Tinker Court faced the challenge of crafting a legal rule that
would protect student speech while also ensuring that constitutionally protected student speech could occur on school grounds without disrupting
school activities.276 With this in mind, the Tinker Court designed its test for
student speech to take into account the specific concerns of the on-campus
school environment. The test it produced was never meant to be applied to
off-campus speech, which would require a test designed to account for the
entirely different concerns that must be balanced when dealing with speech
occurring outside of the school environment.277 Yet, given the role of the
Tinker test in striking a balance between free speech and a disruption-free
school environment, courts and commentators have sought to apply it to the
issue of off-campus internet speech.278 As this has occurred, an important
fact has been ignored—it is unnecessary to apply Tinker to off-campus internet speech because, with the application of measures that do not suppress
off-campus internet speech, the impact of off-campus internet speech on
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594-97.
See supra Part III.A.
Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1093.
See id.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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school activities can be mitigated to the point that it is largely insignificant.279
Schools have many options to prevent off-campus speech from affecting what occurs on middle and high school campuses because school administrators have been properly granted a great deal of power over what
goes on at school during school hours. Schools can ban students from using
electronic devices during the school day, including cell phones and other
wireless devices that may be used to receive or transmit text messages or
access the internet.280 If schools limit students to using school computers
and technology, they can make use of filtering software to prevent access to
certain sites altogether.281 Schools can also place limits on student use of
school computers (and other technology owned by the school) through “acceptable-use policies” (AUPs).282 Schools are generally free to set the rules
for use of school property. Schools may even be able to implement a policy
requiring students to agree not to use school technology in any way that
could foreseeably cause substantial disruption at school (although a better
policy would be much more specific on exactly how students are allowed to
use school property and exactly how they are not allowed to use school
property).283
Schools may also limit speech on campus through time, place, and
manner restrictions designed to make sure that public property may be used
for its designated purpose.284 Schools can prevent problems from arising
through good classroom management. Teachers can require that students
work on schoolwork during the school day—when a teacher is giving a
lesson, it is perfectly reasonable for a student to face school consequences
for sending instant messages to a friend, talking to other students about
social or political issues of public significance, or doing anything other than
following along with the teacher’s instruction and working on schoolwork

279. See infra notes 280-303 and accompanying text.
280. Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1091.
281. Emrick, supra note 17, at 813.
282. Id. at 812. Students can be required to sign AUP agreements before being allowed to use school computers. Students who violate the agreements may be disciplined for
conduct violating the AUP by discipline including restricting future use of school computers.
See id. Today, even more effective enforcement mechanisms allow teachers to exercise
greater control over student use of school computers. Many schools, for example, have installed software in computer labs that allows teachers to monitor student computer use from
a central teacher computer station. Teachers can use it to get a visual display of what is on
each computer screen without having to walk around the room and look at a student’s
screen. Teachers can also use it to remotely take control of student computers when they see
students are using computers inappropriately.
283. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 424-25; Emrick, supra note 17, at 813.
284. See supra Part II.B.4.
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in the classroom.285 As long as schools can provide structured educational
activities to keep students focused on learning during the school day, students will not have the opportunity to follow off-campus web postings. Furthermore, schools may sometimes discipline students for insubordination or
disrespectful conduct occurring on campus even when their off-campus
speech is protected.286 Given the scope of schools’ power to control what
occurs on campus during the school day, it appears that off-campus internet
speech cannot penetrate into school during the school day any further than
schools allow it to.287
Even if off-campus internet speech with the potential to cause substantial disruption does make its way on campus, schools have options to address the problem without disciplining students for the off-campus speech
itself. It is unnecessary for schools to discipline students for the off-campus
speech because they can always discipline the student who brought it to
campus (i.e., the student who (re)communicated or distributed the speech
on campus—in many cases it will be the same student).288 Disciplining the
student who brought the disruptive speech to school appears to be a winwin scenario because it is a more speech-protective policy that is likely to
be just as effective at minimizing disruption during the school day.289 Furthermore, it is a more fair way to deal with the problem because the student
who brings the speech to campus is the one who actually caused the disruption, not the person who merely sent a message over the internet while outside of school.290
Additionally, it is best for schools to limit their authority to on-campus
speech in order to maintain the high level of authority that courts have

285. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1093.
286. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 & n.12, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that a student newspaper was protected as off-campus speech even though students
used school typewriters to transcribe articles and stored copies of the newspaper in a teacher’s closet at school, but suggesting that the students could have been disciplined for insubordination for their on-campus conduct (presumably using the typewriters or teacher’s closet
without permission) if the school had used that as the basis for the discipline); Beussink ex
rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(holding that the student’s off-campus website was protected speech but suggesting that the
student could be disciplined for disrespectful conduct for his on-campus comments to the
school librarian or for insubordination if he had used library computers after being banned
from using them as a result of previous violent and disrespectful behavior).
287. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1093 (noting that internet speech “by [its] very
nature cannot cause an immediate disruption to the work of the school” since it cannot “intrude into the public space,” making it even less disruptive on school activities than the silent
speech in Tinker, which was visible for everyone to see).
288. See, e.g., Emrick, supra note 17, at 813.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 815.
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granted them in dealing with on-campus speech.291 If schools claim the
power to regulate off-campus speech under school speech precedents, it
may weaken those precedents as courts, with an eye to the danger of school
speech precedents reigning in protected speech in the general community,
will likely narrow definitions of substantial disruption.292 As stated by the
Second Circuit in Thomas v. Board of Education: “[O]ur willingness to
grant school officials substantial autonomy within their academic domain
rests in part on the confinement of that power within the metes and bounds
of the school itself.”293 By overreaching beyond the schoolhouse gates,
schools may end up facing a higher burden to prove substantial disruption
in cases involving on-campus speech, which would result in schools losing
authority where they really need it.
When school discipline cannot be applied, several alternatives may
still be available. Parental discipline, which is already relied on to deal with
most of the minor transgressions of children in the community at large, is
always an option.294 When parental discipline is not enough, the same criminal and civil justice system that maintains order in the world outside the
school campus is always available to deal with students whose speech is
part of conduct that constitutes a true threat, inciting illegal activity, harassment, stalking, and defamation, among other things.295 School discipline
is not the only check on off-campus speech, and it is probably less effective
in certain ways than parental discipline and the criminal and civil justice
system.296 Further, criminal penalties for conduct outside of school teach
the lesson that “[r]eal-world speech carries real-world consequences.”297
Furthermore, a school can always deal with off-campus speech it does
not like by engaging in more speech.298 Because of their educational mission, schools can play a very significant role in bringing awareness to issues
that affect members of the school community and educating students about
them.299 Schools can play a more important role than disciplining every
291. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 423 (advocating deference to the decisions of
school administrators regarding speech that occurs under school supervision, but suggesting
that such deference is only appropriate if speech occurring outside school supervision is
protected under the full First Amendment standard).
292. See id.
293. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
294. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1101.
295. See, e.g., Beckstrom, supra note 163, at 316-19; Papandrea, supra note 2, at
1100.
296. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 416; see also supra note 153 (explaining that
other methods of dealing with true threats may be more effective than school discipline).
297. Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at 246.
298. Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at 253,
286.
299. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1098-99.
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student who makes rude and offensive comments over the internet on his or
her own time or acts as a verbal bully toward others while off campus.300
Even though it might, at times (and especially after learning of an incident
where someone was hurt by cyberbullying), seem desirable for someone to
police the general community to prevent bullies from hurting others through
mean-spirited and emotionally abusive online comments, it is not possible
or even desirable for schools to do this.301 Schools can play a more important role by working with students to foster positive relationships and
educating students about the impact of their internet use on others and about
what they can do to protect themselves from abusive online speech.302
Schools can also educate students about the First Amendment, which
should result in students learning that some kinds of speech are not protected.303
Ultimately, schools can maintain a disruption-free environment on
campus despite whatever off-campus internet speech may occur. Therefore,
it is unnecessary to apply Tinker to off-campus internet speech.
ii. Value of Free Speech Rights for Students Outside of School
Allowing schools to apply Tinker to off-campus internet speech
would, at best, result in marginal benefits. It is doubtful those benefits
would outweigh the significant cost. Student speech adds value to communities that may be lost if it is overly burdened by school restrictions. Allowing students free speech while they are off campus is socially beneficial in
the same way that freedom of speech generally is. It gives students the opportunity to contribute to the marketplace of ideas, to develop their own
identities through experimenting with self-expression, and to raise issues of
public concern, including issues relating to school policies that might be of
political and social importance in the general community as well as the
school community.304 Valuable social and political commentary might be
chilled if students are made to run the risk that they could be disciplined for
300. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 416.
301. See Beckstrom, supra note 163, at 283-85, 320 (illustrating the tragic impact of
cyberbullying, but arguing that schools should not be allowed to discipline students for
cyberbullying that occurs off campus unless it constitutes “an objective threat of violence to
students, teachers, or school administrators”); Goldman, supra note 17, at 416. But see Erb,
supra note 176, at 260 (arguing school authority over off-campus internet speech should be
expanded so schools can deal with the problem of cyberbullying); Servance, supra note 176,
at 1213-16, 1238-44 (making the same argument as Erb).
302. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1098-99.
303. E.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at
286.
304. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 414; Heidlage, supra note 153, at 592-93; supra
Part II.A.
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off-campus speech if other students bring it to school or disrupt class by
discussing it instead of doing their classwork.305
Even speech that does not include social and political commentary—
speech that is not at the core of what the First Amendment protects—may
still have significant social utility.306 There is a benefit to students learning
to freely express themselves in the world outside of school.307 If instant
messages sent off campus to a small group of friends can lead to discipline
at school, students may feel constrained in confiding with their close
friends.308 Young people so often communicate via the internet and electronic messages today that this could significantly inhibit communication.309
Furthermore, even pure venting of frustrations appears to have value.
Some suggest that it makes it less likely students will act out in more destructive ways.310 In any case, venting frustrations is an important way that
people share their thoughts and feelings with others and realize that they are
not alone in having those feelings. This is an important coping mechanism
for everyone, no less teenagers struggling with the challenges of adolescence. Given that they spend so much time in school where their right to
free speech is limited, it is important that, as stated by the Thomas court,
“the student is free to speak his mind when the school day ends” (subject,
of course, to the restrictions placed on speech by parents and the criminal
and civil justice system).311
Since Tinker is designed to prevent on-campus disruption, it does not
take much account for the content of the speech or intent of the speaker—if
the speech causes substantial disruption, it can generally be regulated by the
school.312 While this may be appropriate for on-campus speech because it is
305. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 414; Brenton, supra note 217, at 1230.
306. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 414; Heidlage, supra note 153, at 592-93.
307. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 414; Heidlage, supra note 153, at 592-93.
308. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 414; Heidlage, supra note 153, at 592-93.
309. See Hoder, supra note 17, at 1600 (suggesting that current law inhibits communication by sending the message that the only way to avoid school discipline is to avoid
internet speech altogether).
310. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note
139, at 252, 282-85 (arguing that free speech for students outside of school functions as a
“safety-valve,” or a “non-violent and passive method of blowing off steam”).
311. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979); see Calvert, OffCampus Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at 252, 282-85.
312. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1093. The Court and some commentators have
pointed out that the content of speech may matter under the Tinker analysis and that political
speech will receive greater protection than types of speech that do not go to the core of what
the First Amendment protects. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969) (noting that the case only presented an issue concerning regulation
of “direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to pure speech” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Cordes, supra note 132, at 660, 701-04; Erb, supra note 176, at 285 (citing Morse
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an important state interest to have a disruption-free environment at school,
it is not an appropriate standard outside of that setting.313 The Thomas court
provides an illustrative example of the danger of regulating off-campus
speech through a hypothetical situation involving a student-written editorial
in the New York Times criticizing his school and its administration.314 Assume that the student intended his article to have an impact at school, that
he really hoped someone would bring it to school but did not take any action to bring this about, that another student brought it to school, and that
many students disrupted class when this happened by talking about the article. It is possible that Tinker could be applied to uphold school discipline
for the student who wrote the article under all of the following tests: a reasonable foreseeability approach, a sufficient nexus test simply requiring the
speech to reach campus (like that in Killion), a sufficient nexus test based
on intent (like that proposed by Ellison), or an approach requiring that
speech be directed at the school.315 The article could be considered directed
at school administrators, and the student did intend his article to have an
impact on the school (and even intended that it actually be brought to
school). The article did reach school, and it was reasonably foreseeable that
it would come to the attention of school administrators and cause students
to discuss the article at school.316 Nevertheless, disciplining the student for
such speech would chill valuable social and political commentary.317

v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)). The main analysis in
Tinker is centered on whether substantial disruption occurred, though, and political speech is
not necessarily immune from regulation under Tinker. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14 (holding that the political speech at issue—wearing armbands at school as a form of silent protest
against the war in Vietnam—was protected because it did not cause substantial disruption
and, therefore, implying that such speech could be regulated if it did cause substantial disruption); Goldman, supra note 17, at 414.
313. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1093.
314. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1053 n.18. Other commentators have also invoked the
student-written newspaper article example. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1092.
315. See supra Parts IV.B.1.b-d.
316. See supra Parts IV.B.1.b-d.
317. See Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1093. Papandrea points out that almost any offcampus speech could distract students from their work at school stating:
Students may be just as distracted by the new Harry Potter book or XMan movie or an episode of Gossip Girl or a new video game or a new
website as they will be by the message someone has posted on their social networking site. These other cultural influences could also have a
much more profound educational effect on the students than someone’s
e-mail icon or website. It would be unthinkable to permit school officials
to control their students’ access to television shows, movies, public libraries, and other materials on the Internet.
Id.
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iii. Properly Limit School Authority and Maintain View of Schools
as Educational Institutions
School boards are elected for the limited purpose of running schools to
achieve an educational mission.318 Allowing school administrators to regulate off-campus speech intrudes upon the authority that parents, democratically-elected state and local officials, courts, and law enforcement officials
have over activity occurring outside of school.319
Limiting school authority to discipline off-campus student speech also
teaches students an important lesson: different standards for speech and
conduct exist in different places, so people must adjust their behavior and
speech accordingly.320 It can only be beneficial to the educational mission
of schools for students to realize that they must speak and act according to
different standards at school than outside of school.321
Finally, limiting school authority also benefits schools to the extent
that it allows educators to be seen more as educators at school and fellow
human beings outside of school, and less as community disciplinarians imposing school standards of speech and conduct on students wherever they
go.322 Given the nature of our system of compulsory education, it is already
all too easy for students to take oppositional stances toward educators as
authority figures who have so much power over their lives at school.323
Keeping educators out of the business of policing student speech outside of
school should at least help educators to be seen more as fulfilling an educational mission instead.324

318.
319.
145.
320.
321.
322.

Id.

See Caplan, supra note 153, at 145.
See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051 & n.15, 1053 n.18; Caplan, supra note 153, at
Brenton, supra note 217, at 1240-41.
See id.
See Goldman, supra note 17, at 416. Goldman argues that
[l]eaving discipline to parents and the judicial process also has the advantage of keeping schools institutions of learning as opposed to penal
institutions. If schools start policing and punishing off-campus speech,
students’ views of schools, teachers, and administrators may be altered
in a manner that interferes with the learning process itself.

323. See id.
324. See id.; see also Heidlage, supra note 153, at 589-94 (suggesting that schools in
a democratic society should allow freedom of speech as a way of exposing students to democratic norms and values).
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Proposed Rule: Off-Campus Speech May Only Be Treated as OnCampus Speech When It Is Communicated on Campus or Under
School Supervision

Given the fact that there are good alternatives to maintain a disruptionfree environment at school that do not involve regulating off-campus internet speech, the fact that such speech is potentially beneficial, and the proposition that limiting school authority is a good idea, it is best not to allow
schools to apply Tinker to exercise authority over speech that occurs off
campus. Even though most scholars agree with this approach, significant
disagreement remains over when internet speech should be considered on
campus so that it falls within school authority under Tinker.325
Luckily, the rule that should govern this situation is relatively simple
and clear: courts should only apply Tinker to internet speech that was originally created or transmitted from an off-campus location when the speech is
intentionally (re)communicated by its originator while he or she is on campus or under school supervision.326 Only the content that is intentionally
communicated on campus by its originator, and not the entire content of the
off-campus website or email, should be considered on-campus speech.327
Despite the simplicity of this rule, it is true that in some cases, it will
be difficult to determine whether off-campus speech was communicated on
campus. This is because it may be debatable whether a student engaged in
speech communicating certain content or conduct. Conduct alone would not
subject a student to school discipline for the content of off-campus speech,
but it could subject the student to discipline for the conduct itself. In these
difficult cases, courts should apply the U.S. Supreme Court test for communicative conduct from Spence v. Washington to determine if a student
engaged in conduct communicating the content of off-campus internet
speech.328 According to the two-pronged Spence test, communicative con325. See supra Part IV.B.1.f; infra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
326. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 425. Goldman suggests a similar distinction
between speech that is communicated on campus and speech that is not communicated on
campus. See id. As described below, this Comment differs in that it explicitly proposes application of the Spence test to provide a more solid theoretical framework and rule to achieve
a similar result. The rule proposed by this Comment would also achieve different results in
certain specific situations. For example, Goldman proposes allowing schools to discipline
students who create websites off campus and then tell others to access them at school,
Goldman, supra note 17, at 424, which would not be allowed under the rule proposed by this
Comment. See infra Part IV.B.4.a.
327. This is consistent with the principle articulated by some courts that a student
cannot be disciplined solely for content in his or her off-campus website that school officials
do not like. See, e.g., Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800-01 (N.D.
Ohio 2002).
328. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
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duct occurs when “[1] intent to convey a particularized message [is] present, and [2] in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that
the message [will] be understood by those who view[] it.”329 As demonstrated below through application of this proposed rule to specific situations
schools will face in the future, this approach provides a clear and logical
way for courts to decide cases involving off-campus internet speech that
properly protects student speech without threatening the educational mission of schools.
4.

Application of the Proposed Communicated-on-Campus Rule to Specific Scenarios
i.

A Website Created off Campus but Accessed on Campus330

This is quickly becoming a classic scenario faced by courts.331 A student should never be disciplined under Tinker for the content of his or her
website simply because another student accesses it on campus because, in
such a case, the student who created the website did not communicate any
of its content on campus.332 This is true even if the student who created the
329. Id.
330. The analysis in this Subpart should also be applied in cases where the content of
a website is distributed on campus in a way other than through access of a website. This
might occur if a student brought printouts of their website to school. See, e.g., Killion v.
Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001). The issue with
respect to disciplining a student for the content of the website created off campus should still
be the extent to which it was communicated. A school could discipline the student who
actually distributed the material at school for his or her on-campus conduct even if it cannot
discipline the student who created the speech at home. See supra Part IV.B.3.a. A school
may be allowed to apply school rules that discipline the student simply for the conduct of
bringing the material to school (assuming the school can legally ban that type of conduct)
even if the speech content of it was not communicated, as long as the school disciplines the
student only for the conduct and not for any of his or her off-campus speech.
331. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850-52
(Pa. 2002).
332. A special case might arise when a student creates a website that serves as a
forum for other students to post comments. See Caplan, supra note 153, at 163-78. The same
principle applies to this situation, though—a student should not be held responsible for the
posts of others, and a student should not be subject to discipline for the off-campus content
of their website simply because another student makes a post to the website on campus. See
id. at 163. An interesting exception could apply if a student was, privately without showing
or communicating the website to others, editing posts other students made to his or her website at school. See id. at 163-78. Under this Comment’s approach, though, the student still
probably could not be held responsible for the content of another student’s post unless, by
editing the post, he or she intended to communicate a message in accord with the post that
others would be likely to understand. An editor usually does not intend to actually communicate the content of the document he or she is editing, but rather a different message
about his or her own website, so only the latter could be considered as intentionally commu-
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website told or encouraged the other student to access the website on campus since it was still the other student who made the choice to bring the
content on campus.333 Therefore, let us assume going forward that the student who created the website was the one who accessed it at school.
The first question in such a situation should always be whether the
student was disciplined for the content of his or her off-campus website or
for his or her conduct in accessing the website. A school is always within
its authority to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
on-campus activity. 334 So, a school could, for example, implement a policy
that only allows students to access the internet at certain times with proper
permission, or only allows students to use school computers (rather than
personal wireless devices) during the school day. Schools may discipline
students for conduct that violates these policies as long as the discipline is
not based on the content of an off-campus website.335 Additionally, schools
may have AUPs that limit the websites students are allowed to access on
school-owned computers or other school-owned electronic devices.336 A
student may also be disciplined for violating valid AUPs provided he or she
had appropriate notice of the policy and provided he or she was not discinicated on campus. See id. For example, a student who created a forum off campus and went
on the site at school to edit a post containing what he viewed as inappropriate language for
his site (and did so privately without showing the webpage to others at school) could not be
held responsible for the language of the post, but only for the message that he intends his site
not to have such language on it. See Caplan, supra note 153, at 163-78. Complicating things
even more, however, it is possible that an editor or publisher could be held responsible for
the content of publications over which he or she exercises editorial control and that this
editorial control could be considered as on-campus communication if done on campus. See
id. Ironing out the difficulties raised by this hypothetical situation is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
333. This is a more speech-protective position than that taken by several other commentators who follow the geographic and temporal approach. These commentators would
allow off-campus speech to be considered on-campus speech if the creator of an off-campus
website encouraged others to access the site on campus. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus
Speech, On-Campus Punishment, supra note 139, at 252-53, 285; Goldman, supra note 17,
at 423-25; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799, 805. Under this Comment’s proposed approach,
the only proper exception (other than the rare case in which this encouragement might
somehow satisfy Brandenburg incitement to illegal activity) allowing the creator of the
website to be disciplined when another student accesses and communicates the site on campus would be if the other student was the agent of the creator of the website. This could
result, for example, if the creator of the website not only encouraged but paid the other student to communicate the contents of the website on campus, if the creator of the website was
the employer of the other student (and accessing the website at school was within the scope
of employment), or if both students were co-conspirators acting in furtherance of a criminal
conspiracy.
334. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
335. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
336. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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plined for the content of his or her website.337 It is possible that in the future, courts will have to deal with this scenario less frequently as schools
learn how to implement AUPs, ban the use of private wireless electronic
devices during the school day, and use filtering software on school computers to limit student access to potentially disruptive websites during the
school day.338
Assuming that the student’s conduct of accessing the website was not
prohibited by a school policy functioning as a valid time, place, or manner
restriction, and that the school wanted to discipline him or her based on the
content of his or her website, the next question would be whether the student communicated the content of his or her website while on campus. It is
possible a student might access a website with the intent that that action
itself communicate a particular message to another student (but in most
cases, there would need to be more evidence of a gesture or speech that
made it clear that the student was attempting to show or communicate the
website accessed to another student).339 The message intended could be
related to the content of the website (e.g., a student wishes to show another
student words or images contained on the website) or unrelated to the content of the website (e.g., a student only wishes to show another student that
he is accessing the internet during school even though his parents told him
not to). A school could not discipline the student for the content of his or
her website if the student did not intend to communicate a message related
to the content of the website. If, however, the student did intend to communicate words or images on the website to another student, and it was
likely that the other student would understand the message conveyed, the
student’s actions should be considered communicative conduct that satisfies
337. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
338. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
339. This approach is consistent with the more stringent geographic and temporal
approach that requires more than simply accessing a website to transform its contents from
off-campus speech into on-campus speech. Where some commentators have argued that a
student must access his or her website and show it to other students, this Comment argues
that he or she must access the website and communicate it in a way that a satisfies the
Spence test. This Comment’s approach is very similar to these approaches with very subtle
differences. See, e.g., Hoder, supra note 17, at 1594-95 (suggesting that accessing a website
created outside of school supervision and showing it to other students would make it speech
under school supervision and control). See also Goldman, supra note 17, at 423-25 (suggesting the same as Hoder except going further to suggest a distinction between speech that was
communicated and speech that was not communicated on campus—this approach is essentially the same as this Comment’s except for the application of the Spence test). This Comment’s approach differs from those who take the geographic and temporal approach but
suggest that accessing an off-campus website on campus is sufficient to transform the speech
into on-campus speech. See, e.g., Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment,
supra note 139, at 252-53, 285; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799, 805.
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the Spence test.340 In such a case, the school could apply Tinker to the content of the website that the student communicated. It is important to note
that all of the contents of the website do not then become transformed from
off-campus speech to on-campus speech. Only the contents of the website
that the student communicated (or attempted to communicate), as defined in
Spence, may then be treated as on-campus speech subject to Tinker and
Fraser.341 After establishing the speech was on campus, the school would
be allowed to discipline the student if the on-campus speech was lewd, vulgar, or indecent, or if it caused (or could reasonably be forecast to cause)
substantial disruption to school activities.
ii. Electronic Communication Created and/or Transmitted While
at School
This situation might arise if a student, while at school and under
school supervision, sent a text message, an instant message, or an email;
posted a comment to any website; or accessed a website that he or she created off campus to change its content (assuming that the school wanted to
discipline the student for the content of his or her message, comment, or
website).342 The key issue would be whether the off-campus content was
intentionally communicated on campus.343 Generally, all of this activity
involves on-campus communication. When a student at school sends (i.e.,
340. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
341. Note that once the speech is (re)communicated and becomes on-campus speech,
it should be subject to all student speech precedents including Fraser as well as Tinker.
342. Being under school supervision is necessary because Tinker would not apply if
the student was on school property but not under school supervision. This might occur if the
school opened a public forum where community groups were allowed to use school facilities
on weekends for certain events and a student was attending such an event. Also note that
school discipline for a reason other than the content of the message, comment, or website
could be possible. The same analysis as to whether the school was disciplining a student for
off-campus speech or for violating a time, place, and manner restriction banning use of
certain electronic devices during school hours, or an AUP, as was applied in Part IV.B.4.a
supra would apply in such a situation.
343. Several commentators advocating a geographic and temporal approach appear
to take similar positions as this Comment on this particular issue of emails and texts sent
while at school. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 423-45 (arguing that such communications
should be considered under school supervision because they are “created and received instantaneously”); Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1091 (arguing that a text sent during school
hours should be considered on-campus speech); Emrick, supra note 17, at 799 (suggesting
such speech occurring during school hours would be considered on campus only if it was
communicated). At least one commentator who supports the geographic and temporal approach holds a less speech-protective position on this particular issue, though. See Hoder,
supra note 17, at 1594-95 (suggesting that creating the speech while under school supervision might be enough to make the speech on campus even if it was not transmitted or communicated).
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transmits) an email, text message, or instant message, the student is attempting to communicate a message while under school supervision.344 The
same is true when a student posts a comment to a website while under
school supervision.345 In both cases, the student is attempting to communicate a message on campus even if the message is intended to be sent to
someone who is off campus.
The situation becomes complicated when a student creates/types an
email or text message off campus and sends it while under school supervision, or if a student creates such a message on campus and sends it while
off campus. In the former case, the content of the student’s message would
be considered on campus because the transmission of the message, which
itself constitutes communication, occurred on campus. If an email or text
message was created on campus but not sent until after a student left campus, however, it would not have been communicated on campus.346 Therefore, its content should not be subject to Tinker or Fraser.347
The case of a student accessing his or her own website at school to
make changes to it presents an interesting issue. Caplan suggests that the
content of a website should not be considered on-campus speech simply
because a student accesses a website he or she created off campus to fix a
typo.348 This Comment’s approach would not allow the entire content of the
website to be considered on-campus speech in such a case, but it would not
rule out that the message communicated through the change in the website
might be considered on-campus speech. The key question would be whether the change to the website was intended to communicate a particular message related to the content of the off-campus website that others would be
likely to understand.349
344. See supra Part IV.B.3.
345. See supra Part IV.B.3.
346. Most commentators do not specifically address the difference between creating
and transmitting emails, texts, and instant messages. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 2, at
1091 (discussing only “send[ing]” texts). Some commentators appear to support the approach advocated by this Comment, though, by using language suggesting such electronic
messages must be communicated, rather than just created, under school supervision for the
content of the speech to be considered under school supervision. See Goldman, supra note
17, at 425; Emrick, supra note 17, at 799. Others suggest that creating the speech under
school supervision is enough to consider the speech as under school supervision even if it
was not actually communicated while under school supervision. See, e.g., Hoder, supra note
17, at 1594-95.
347. However, it is possible that other school policies might apply here since an
unsent text message is essentially like a note that was written but not passed yet. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 425 (making the analogy between electronic communications and
printed notes). Writing a note instead of paying attention during class is conduct that can be
disciplined.
348. Caplan, supra note 153, at 152-53.
349. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
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Generally, when someone makes changes to a website, they intend to
make a change to the message they are communicating. Changing the content of a website is a form of communication that happens instantly so that a
student who is making such a change should usually be considered to have
communicated a message related to the content of the website on campus.350
If a student just fixes a typo, however, it is possible this would not
change the content of the message in any way that would be likely to be
understood by others.351 The only message might be that the student wishes
to use proper spelling and grammar on his or her website, which would
probably be a message that was unrelated to the content of the website.
Even if the message was related to the content, fixing a typo would probably have so little impact on the message of the website that very little of its
off-campus content would actually be communicated on campus; therefore,
very little of it could be treated as on-campus speech. On the other hand, it
is possible, though unlikely, that changing a typo could have a significant
impact on the message by changing one word into another word and completely changing the content of the website. In such a case, the content of
the off-campus website should be considered as being communicated on
campus and should be subject to Tinker and Fraser; but again, only the part
of the website that was communicated through the alteration to its content
should be considered on campus.352
iii. Sending an Email from off Campus to a School Email Account
or Posting Content to a School-Sponsored Website from off
Campus
The content of a post to a school-sponsored website should fall under
Kuhlmeier as speech in a school-sponsored publication, which is subject to
the highest level of school regulation of any form of speech.353 Schoolsponsored websites should include course websites, such as a class Blackboard page.354 A school email account should also be considered a schoolsponsored website. School speech rules including Tinker and Fraser
should, therefore, apply to allow students to be disciplined for the content
of their speech in emails sent either to or from school email accounts. 355
350. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 425.
351. This would not satisfy the second prong of the Spence test, so in such a case, the
speech should be considered off campus. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
352. See supra Part IV.B.3.
353. See supra Part III.B.
354. See supra Part III.B.
355. Some courts and commentators have reached this result by suggesting that offcampus internet speech “directed at” school staff could be disciplined under Tinker. See
supra Part IV.B.1. That is different than the approach advocated by this Comment, which
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This issue would most likely come up if a student sent a lewd, vulgar, indecent, threatening, or disruptive message to a teacher at his or her school
email account (or to a fellow student at his or her school email account).
This conduct should be subject to discipline even if it does not rise to the
level of harassment, and even if it does not disrupt school.
iv. Speech Created While Using a School Laptop from an OffCampus Location
Today, schools are increasingly providing students laptops to complete
school-related assignments. Some schools now allow students to take
school laptops home. This makes it increasingly likely that a case will arise
where a school seeks to discipline a student for speech the student created
or transmitted using a school laptop from home. This presents an interesting
scenario that may be challenging for courts to decide.
First, it is worth noting that schools may use AUPs to restrict student
use of school laptops.356 Schools can implement AUPs prohibiting students
from using school laptops for anything other than doing schoolwork, and/or
schools can prohibit students from using school laptops to access certain
websites or transmit personal messages.357 If a student with proper notice of
an AUP chooses to violate the AUP, a school can always discipline the student for the conduct of violating the AUP.358
But, what if a school wants to discipline a student for the content of
speech created or transmitted on a school laptop from an off-campus location? Arguably, the school has no need to extend its reach over this kind of
off-campus speech. After all, the school has sole control over whether it
allows students to take school laptops home. It can end this practice if it
judges the risks outweigh the benefits. Further, the school has the option of
disciplining students for violating AUPs, which may be grounds for termination of a student’s laptop privileges.359 Given this, it seems unnecessary
to allow schools to also discipline students for the speech.
On the other hand, arguably courts should treat student activity on laptops at home the same as student activity on computers at school.360 The
only allows regulation of emails sent off campus if they are sent through a school email
account. The former approach allows off-campus speech to be restricted and could throw a
wide net over other forms of speech, see supra Parts IV.B.1-2, while this Comment’s approach only allows emails to or from school email accounts to be regulated because these
emails occur in a school-sponsored website.
356. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
357. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
358. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
359. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
360. See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
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school laptop could be treated like a miniature, mobile campus so that all
student activity on the laptop is on-campus activity wherever it occurs. Arguably, school restrictions on student speech with school laptops would not
significantly restrict student speech rights because students may easily
avoid school regulation by using their own computers, computers at a public library, or some other means of communicating the same message that
does not involve use of school laptops.
This Comment’s approach admittedly does not clearly resolve this
question, but it does provide some guidance. At most, student speech on
school laptops could only be subject to discipline to the same extent as student speech on on-campus computers would be.361 As discussed above,
under this Comment’s approach, a student could not be disciplined for the
content of an off-campus email or website for simply accessing the email or
website on a school computer on campus if the student did not also intentionally communicate the content of that email or website while on campus.362 Similarly, an email or text message that a student typed/created
while on campus, but transmitted while off campus, would not be considered on-campus speech. The same rule would have to apply as a limitation
against school authority over speech created (but not transmitted) using
school laptops.363 This means that a student would only be subject to discipline for speech they created using a school laptop if they then communicated the content of that speech on campus.364
Speech that is not just created but actually transmitted by a student using a school laptop from an off-campus location might be treated differently. As noted above, emails and other communications that are transmitted
from an on-campus location would be subject to school speech restrictions
because transmitting internet speech from on campus is communicating a
message on campus.365 If a laptop is just a portable piece of the school
campus, arguably any online communications a student actually sends using
the laptop would be subject to school speech precedents.366 This is one of
the few cases where differences between a geographic approach and a temporal approach might make a substantive difference in the outcome. Ultimately, school authority is best viewed as limited in space and time.367 This
may suggest that the best policy is to not allow schools to apply school
speech precedents to govern speech students transmit using school laptops
from an off-campus location. To do so would appear to improperly extend
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
See supra Parts IV.B.4.a-b.
See supra Part IV.B.1.f.
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school jurisdiction in both space and time so that it would truly be left
without definable limits. Additionally, it would encourage schools to engage in investigations regarding student speech that takes place after the
school day is over, which could intrude into student privacy and chill student speech.368
v. Inciting Substantial Disruption from an Off-Campus Location
The Thomas court issued an important holding in defense of students’
right to free speech while off campus.369 The court persuasively demonstrated the importance of protecting student speech, and stated:
When school officials are authorized to punish speech on
school property, the student is free to speak his mind when
the school day ends. In this manner, the community is not
deprived of the salutary effects of expression, and educational authorities are free to establish an academic environment in which the teaching and learning process can
proceed free of disruption. Indeed, our willingness to grant
school officials substantial autonomy within their academic
domain rests in part on the confinement of that power within the metes and bounds of the school itself.370
In an oft-cited footnote to the same paragraph quoted here, the Thomas
court, in an apparent act of judicial discretion, stated: “We can, of course,
envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption
within the school from some remote locale. We need not, however, address
this scenario . . . .”371 As a final example, I address this scenario.
To start, it is important to note that Brandenburg would apply to make
speech unprotected under the full First Amendment standard if a student
was inciting imminent illegal activity of a serious nature.372 This should
cover a situation where a student incites other students to engage in violence, or other illegal activity of a serious nature, at school.373 Some commentators have suggested that a modified version of Brandenburg with a
368. Cf. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“When school officials are authorized to punish speech on school property, the student is
free to speak his mind when the school day ends. . . . Indeed, our willingness to grant school
officials substantial autonomy within their academic domain rests in part on the confinement
of that power within the metes and bounds of the school itself.”).
369. See id.
370. Id. at 1052.
371. Id. at 1052 n.17.
372. See supra Part II.B.2.
373. See supra Part II.B.2.
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relaxed imminence requirement might apply to cases involving school
speech, or to cases involving internet speech.374 Assuming Brandenburg
without these alterations, however, applying the same rule proposed in Part
IV.A for the true threat analysis to Brandenburg cases would result in
schools at least being able to discipline students who advocate imminent
illegal activity that has a sufficient connection to the school.375
Whether Tinker should apply in this situation is a separate issue from
how Brandenburg should be applied. The only reason to apply the studentspeech standard in Tinker (instead of using a variant of Brandenburg)
would be to prevent students from inciting disruptive activity that was not
also criminal activity.376
Despite all of the technological advances in the thirty years since
Thomas was decided (which would seem to increase the likelihood that
students would be able to use technology to incite disruption from off campus), it appears that no court has decided a case requiring it to address the
issue of students using communications technology to incite substantially
disruptive activity from off campus that was not covered under Brandenburg. In reality, the case of a student using internet speech to incite other
students to disrupt school from an off-campus location is unlikely to become a problem for schools because of the control schools are properly
allowed to exercise over the on-campus school environment.377 Additionally, schools can always discipline any student who actually causes disruption
on campus to deal with the problem instead of disciplining a student who
“incited” other students to be disruptive through a post to Facebook, for
example.378 Although some have suggested applying Tinker to off-campus
student speech due to fear of students inciting substantial disruption via the
374. In his dissent in Morse, Justice Stevens suggested that he might consider applying Brandenburg with a watered down imminence requirement in on-campus cases involving school discipline. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 439 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Caplan appears to have suggested that courts might apply a version of Brandenburg
covering disruptive activity rather than only illegal activity. See supra notes 265-66 and
accompanying text. The test as he describes it appears to leave out an imminence requirement. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text. At least one commentator discussing
speech outside of the school context has suggested internet speech could never satisfy the
imminence requirement of Brandenburg because posting something on a website can never
incite illegal conduct that could be properly considered imminent due to uncertainty about
when viewers would actually see the posted speech. See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge
for the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U.
L. REV. 425, 428 (2002). He proposed relaxing the Brandenburg requirements to create a
suitable standard for internet speech. See id. at 455.
375. See supra Part IV.A.
376. See supra Parts II.B.2., III.A.
377. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
378. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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internet from off campus, it appears this is simply unnecessary.379 Furthermore, extending Tinker to this type of off-campus speech would have a
similar chilling effect on potentially beneficial student speech as the other
applications of Tinker to off-campus speech discussed above.380 Therefore,
only a full First Amendment standard such as Brandenburg or Watts, and
not a school speech precedent, should apply in such a situation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the proliferation of online speech, the issue of whether, and to
what extent, schools can discipline students for off-campus internet speech
is likely to be raised with even greater frequency in the future. Two major
challenges are likely to present themselves going forward. The first involves dealing with threatening speech in a way that maximizes school
safety without setting a precedent that extends school authority unnecessarily beyond the schoolhouse gates. Most courts today do not consider whether schools have authority over the speech when applying the true threat
doctrine. This is problematic because it fails to limit school authority and
could result in schools gaining increasing power to regulate off-campus
speech and conduct that should, instead, fall under the authority of parents
and the local community. An approach that requires some connection between the school and the true threat, such as a sufficient nexus, would place
appropriate limits on school authority without decreasing safety. This simple test is the best change that should be made in this area since it would
allow schools to discipline students for off-campus threats involving the
school or school staff without allowing schools to discipline students who
engage in off-campus threatening conduct that is unrelated to the school.
Schools could suspend or expel students who make threats against the
school in the interest of protecting the school if it became necessary. And
the mission of public schools to educate all children, even those who have
made mistakes in their lives outside of school, would remain intact by leaving children who make off-campus threats unrelated to the school to be
dealt with by parents and police only.
The second challenge presented by the regulation of off-campus internet speech involves speech that does not pose any serious threat and would
be protected outside of the school context but that may have disruptive potential or seem lewd, vulgar, or offensive to some. Fortunately, off-campus
internet speech is unlikely to pose a major threat to schools’ ability to maintain discipline since schools are properly allowed to implement a multitude
of measures to maintain a disruption-free environment at school. These
379.
380.

See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
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measures make it unlikely that internet speech will penetrate schools in a
way that has a significant impact on school activities. Given this and the
fact that free speech rights for students using the internet off campus may
be beneficial to American society in many ways, it is important that students’ right to free speech off campus be protected. Therefore, school
speech precedents such as Tinker and Fraser should not be applied to offcampus internet speech, which should instead be governed only by the full
First Amendment standard. But, due to the complexities of internet communications, this does not resolve the issue. It is also important that the
distinction between on- and off-campus speech be properly made in order
to ensure appropriate protection for student internet speech. In order to
promote clarity and to offer a more speech-protective standard, this Comment proposes that student off-campus internet speech should only be treated as on-campus speech when it is intentionally (re)communicated on campus by its originator, and that the Spence test be used as a way to determine
if off-campus content has been communicated on campus. It also proposes
how this method could be applied to increase clarity and properly protect
speech in specific situations that frequently arise. This approach appears to
be the best way to balance the need to establish a disruption-free environment in schools with the fundamental right of freedom of speech, a right
that all should be allowed to enjoy without excessive state interference.
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